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Summary 
The objective of the study is threefold: first, to describe in what ways, if any, the 
Catholic community of Sant’ Egidio contributed to the conflict resolution of the 
Mozambican civil war and the negotiation for the Algerian crisis in 1994-95. Second, 
analyze to what extent Sant’ Egidio’s contributions in Mozambique and Algeria were 
expressions of faith-based mediation. Finally, to analyze why this form of mediation 
worked in Mozambique and failed in Algeria.    
The insights from theories and research on religious actors’ potential and efforts in 
peacemaking indicate that these actors’ views on how to reach an agreement differs 
from some of the traditional interest-based theories on negotiations derived from 
rational actor models. The faith-based approach emphasises the psychological factors 
of a conflict to a stronger degree than more traditional approaches, whose emphasis 
lies on the incompatible goals and issues of the conflict.     
On the basis of the research question the thesis discusses two hypotheses: first, that the 
hallmarks of faith-based mediation were salient in the resolution of the Mozambican 
conflict and in the negotiations for Algeria. Second, that religion played a key role in 
the negotiation and that it played out positively for the mediators in Catholic 
Mozambique and negatively in Muslim Algeria.   
The findings indicate that Sant’ Egidio’s contribution was limited, but important, in 
both cases. Further, certain of the hallmarks of faith-based mediation were present in 
both cases, thus the evidence supports the idea that faith-based mediation was salient 
for the negotiations. However, religion did not play a key role in either of the two 
cases. The outcome of both cases must therefore be attributed to causes beyond 
religious factors. Religion played a more indirect, albeit positive, role in both cases 
through the mediators and their approach, most explicitly seen in the initial phases of 
the negotiations. 
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Foreword  
In what better ways can a student spend his formative years during one’s education 
than to study conflict resolution? I consider myself fortunate to have had the 
opportunity to spend the most important weeks and months of my academic career 
scrutinizing and learning about how people can meet the appalling, but none the less, 
constant challenge of conflict.  
The academic realm of conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation is a vast area of 
research. My modest hope was to find a small piece within this realm with aspects still 
uncovered, and nuances still worth analysing, in order to contribute to our knowledge 
in the field.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background and research questions 
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in applying religion to peacemaking1 
efforts; this constitutes the fundamental strand of thought underlying this thesis. On a 
general level this thesis looks into the potential of implementing religion in negotiation 
and conflict resolution.2 More specifically, it assesses the role of religious mediators 
and their strategies in two cases of conflict resolution.  
In order to provide a greater understanding of the full range of human imperatives in 
war and peace, Douglas Johnston recognizes a need in the field of conflict resolution 
to implement factors such as religion, which traditionally have been left out of the 
policy-makers’ calculus (Johnston 2003: xi-xii). Indeed, according to Harpviken and 
Røislien, religious peacemakers explore and apply new and different tools and 
opportunities that lie outside conventional diplomacy (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 1). 
This thesis explores one of the most successful and esteemed religious actors engaged 
in peacemaking, the Catholic lay-community of Sant’ Egidio. 
Sant’ Egidio has been engaged in the resolution of several conflicts worldwide.3 No 
organization had more success in negotiating peace during the 1990s (Appleby 2001: 
829), and their role as mediators in the settling of the tragic civil war in Mozambique 
in 1992 earned them a reputation for being a «network of peace», as well as a 
nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. However, despite the efforts of Sant’ Egidio to 
bring the Algerian civil war to an end in 1995, the conflict continued in an intensified 
manner.  
The aim of my thesis is reflected in my three research questions:  
                                                
1 Peacemaking refers to the action taken to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 
11). 
2 I wrote a term paper on the subject of religious peacemakers in PECOS 4100 in 2009. However, this thesis is based on new 
and independent research and none of the conclusions build on the term paper. Parts of the theoretical framework and 
empirical background may correspond.  
3 The community has since 1996 been engaged in peace negotiations in Guatemala, Albania, Burundi, Bosnia, Liberia, Togo, 
Northern-Uganda and The Ivory Coast. At the present they are engaged in Sudan, Guinea Conakry and Somalia (Emberti 
Gialloreti 03.02.2010).    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1. In what ways, if any, did Sant’ Egidio contribute to the conflict resolution in 
Mozambique and the negotiations in Algeria?  
2. To what extent were Sant’ Egidio’s contributions in Mozambique and Algeria 
expressions of faith-based mediation?  
3. Why did this form of mediation work in Mozambique and fail in Algeria? 
Apparent from these research-questions is the focus on the mediator. Many theories on 
mediation, both normative and descriptive, have centred on the different parties to a 
conflict: how they should act, how they act as rational actors, and how their actions 
influence the outcome of the mediation process (Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 2). Even 
though the acts and history of the belligerents will be illuminated in order to fully 
understand what shaped the outcome of negotiations, the unit of analysis here will be 
Sant’ Egidio and their strategy of mediation.  
In order to analyze the religious dimensions present and illuminate to what extent 
these dimensions were influential, there is also a need to see these dimensions in 
relation to the political backdrop of the negotiations. Faith-based mediators’ ability to 
act and influence depend, in many cases, on the structural-environmental context of 
the conflict. Hence, to better understand the premises for Sant’ Egidio’s work, I am 
required to consider the historical, political and social context of the conflicts. The 
analysis will thus also point to forces outside the realm of religion, in order to better 
assess the effect of Sant’ Egidio’s efforts.  
1.2 Literature review and knowledge-gaps 
As one looks to the end of the century and beyond, the challenges of preventing or resolving conflict are 
likely to prove even more formidable than they have in the past […] different approaches will be required 
– approaches that key to deep-rooted human relationships rather than to state-centred philosophies. Far 
greater insight into the human dimensions of the conflict and its resolution will be required on the part of 
foreign policy and religious practitioners than has been demonstrated to date. (Johnston 1994: 7). 
Thinkers such as Comte, Durkheim, Weber, Nietzsche, Toennies and Voltaire all 
believed that religion – as the «basis for understanding and running the world» – 
would be replaced by the age of enlightenment (Fox & Sandler 2004: 10). Edward 
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Luttwak claims that the heritage from these writers and the «compelling fashion» of 
enlightenment prohibited all general and intellectual interest in religion and its 
institutions, even in secular affairs (Luttwak 1994: 9). Within the social sciences, the 
modernization-theory 4 in political science, and the secularization-theory 5 in 
sociology, imprinted the notion that the modern development inevitably would lead to 
more secular and rational societies (Fox & Sandler 2004: 10-12). In short, the 
emerging notion within the social sciences held that religious influence on the one 
hand, and the progress of knowledge on the other, were mutually exclusive (Luttwak 
1994: 10). The influence of the realist school 6 and a Western-centric focus on 
international affairs consequently led scholars of war and peace to consider religion 
insignificant in the international arena (Fox & Sandler 2004: 26). According to Stanton 
Burnett, political realism is and always has been «dogmatically and unflinchingly 
secular» (Burnett 1994: 293): Its denial of human factors such as religion was only 
part of its extensive and coherent denial of all cultural influence on a state’s behaviour 
(ibid: 292-293). 
 
With its emphasis on the state as the basic unit in international politics, realism left no 
room for spiritualism or sacred values, Fox and Sandler claim (Fox & Sandler 2004: 
29). Laustsen and Waever even assert that International Relations as a subject is, in 
part, founded on the belief that the era of religion as a cause of war is over (Laustsen 
& Waever, 2000: 706). 
However, in spite of this historic trend, in recent years religion has re-emerged as a 
seemingly potent force in the international arena and hence achieved greater 
prominence in the political debate (Appleby 2001: 821-822, Rubin 1994: 20-24). This 
was the conclusion of a two-year study by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs 
                                                
4 The theory posits that the process of modernization would lead to the demise of factors like ethnicity and religion (Fox & 
Sandler 2004: 10). In it’s revised version, sketched out by José Casanova, it acknowledges that there has been a 
differentiation between religious and state-institutions, but there has not yet been a privatization of religion that has carried 
with it it’s decline (Casanova 1994: 35-38, Appleby 2001: 821).   
5 The theory states in short that the modern state, built on rational and scientific principles, is legitimized by democratic 
institutions and «the will of the people», religion is no longer needed to legitimize the state and explain and interpret the 
world (Fox & Sandler 2004: 11).   
6 The traditional realist school regards the world as anarchy. The main actors, the nation-states, are constantly pursuing more 
power in competition with other states in order to secure their own sovereignty. International institutions, universal norms or 
individuals are not considered influential in a state’s rational struggle for survival. The main means for usurping power is 
military might (Baylis et. al 2008: 2). 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presented for the White House in February 2010. According to the report, religion is 
playing an increasingly influential role in the public sphere, both positively and 
negatively (Appleby et. al 2010: 5). Social sciences’ inherent modus operandi of 
reflecting and interpreting the actual affairs and the development of the world may 
therefore carry with it a need for including religion.  
The Iranian revolution, the radicalization of religious groups in the Middle East, the 
rise of Hindu nationalism in India and the continual threat of terrorism are some 
situations that have contributed to fixing the theoretical focus on religion’s deleterious 
impact on political order and human rights (Appleby 2001: 821-822). In his 
assessment of these movements, Mark Juergensmeyer states: «First, they have all been 
violent – even vicious – a manner calculated to terrifying. And, second, they have been 
motivated by religion» (Juergensmeyer 2001: 4). No wonder contemporary Western 
societies have had a tendency of viewing strong religious convictions as constituting a 
negative force (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 352). According to Appleby, the «irony» 
is that religion is also the source of «nonviolent conflict transformation, the defence of 
human rights, integrity in government, and reconciliation and stability in divided 
societies» (Appleby 2001: 821).  
Theoreticians mention several foundational attributes that give religion a unique 
potential in the work with peace and conflict resolution.7 Johnston and Cox highlight 
four. First, religion represents a stable and pervasive influence in local communities 
(Johnston & Cox 2003: 13).8 Theodore M. Hesburgh writes in the same mind that 
«peace is a universal hope, but begins as a local reality», and further asserts that no 
actors are more local – and trustworthy – than the leader of worship at a mosque, 
synagogue, church, or temple (Hesburgh 2000: ix). Second, Johnston and Cox 
underscore the idea that the reputation of religion as being an apolitical force derived 
                                                
7 I have two caveats in relation to the theoretical framework, which will be more thoroughly presented in chapter 3. First, the 
authors and the theoretical framework in the field tend to emphasise the importance and peacemaking potential of religion to 
such a degree that they run the risk of developing an uncritical attitude that takes the importance of religion in conflict 
transformation for granted. Second, in my view, certain of the hallmarks of faith-based mediation are not necessarily 
exclusive for religious actors. Secular mediators and mediation theory in general applies many of the same tools. Aware of 
this, I nevertheless apply the current theoretical framework due to the lack of other options in this field.    
8 The report from The Chicago Council on Global Affairs on religion and U.S foreign policy also emphasise the influence of 
religious groups with newly won voices. One of the main reasons behind their growing influence in many areas of the world 
and the revitalization of religion is globalization, the report concludes (Appleby et. al 2010: 6-7).  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from a respected set of values acquits it from charges of seeking power and influence. 
Third, they claim that religion holds a unique leverage for reconciliation and the 
reconstruction of healthy relations through its tenets of neighbour-love and 
forgiveness. Finally, religious leaders often have a wide network and the 
accompanying capability of mobilizing support for peace on all levels of society 
(Johnston & Cox 2003: 13-14). In addition to these factors, Fox and Sandler 
underscore the notion of legitimacy as another contributing aspect of religion. Many 
persons hold normative values, including religious values, as being an important factor 
in international relations (Fox & Sandler 2004: 163). They can be applied to justify 
and support some policies, and oppose others. From religion’s dual nature, one can 
find support for violence and war on the one hand, and reconciliation and peace on the 
other (ibid: 35-40). A final aspect is that of institutions. The lack of other strong social 
institutions in weak states throughout the Third World makes the churches and the 
mosques important (ibid: 22). They serve the function of giving people social goals, 
defining values, and keeping relations to foreign networks. Politically they are 
important as one of the few functional dimensions of the civil society (ibid: 23-24). 
Thomson contends that none of the ideologies or belief-systems that African 
politicians historically have offered has ever superseded the notion of Christianity and 
Islam in African minds (Thomson 2004: 68).  
Thus, the realities of ethnic and religiously inspired wars along with religion’s 
seemingly continued pertinence have resulted in a different approach to conflict 
resolution: an approach that examines and applies the constructive elements of 
religion. Some have attempted to develop theoretical concepts to categorize these.9  
In his influential book, «The Ambivalence of the Sacred», R. Scott Appleby labels the 
actors who seek insights and practices from their respected religions in order to limit 
deadly conflicts as «religious militants» (Appleby 2000: 6). No less passionate than 
their violent counterparts, Appleby claims that religious militants can play a critical 
and positive role in world affairs not when they moderate themselves, but when they 
                                                
9 Considering the diversity of the field and the amount of articles and books approaching the theme from different angles I 
only seek to present a selection of influential writers that I find pertinent, in addition to the writers already mentioned.   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remain as deeply religious as they are (ibid: 13-15). However, he emphasises that 
nonviolent religious militancy becomes politically effective over the long term «only 
when it spans a spectrum of actors at different levels of society, all of whom are 
working in collaboration for the nonviolent resolution of conflict and the building of 
stable political structures and social relations» (ibid: 122). Appleby explicitly refers to 
Sant’ Egidio in his work and claims their role in the Mozambique negotiations was a 
success built on their integrity as a non-partisan actor and their fundamental apolitical 
nature which enabled them to cooperate with every actor in the local and global arena 
(ibid: 162-164). In the Algerian negotiations, however, he only skims the surface and 
states that the conflict continued due to the Algerian government’s lack of cooperation 
(ibid: 291).      
Johnston’s book, «Faith-Based Diplomacy» from 2003 builds on Johnston’s and 
Sampson’s earlier work, «Religion – The Missing Dimension of Statecraft» from 
1994. Building on the accumulation of knowledge and experiences from religious 
actors in conflict resolution, Johnston develops a theoretical framework from which he 
analyses the peacemaking tenets of religions and the roles of religious actors in several 
conflicts.10  
In 2005, Harpviken and Røislien wrote the report «Mapping the Terrain: The Role of 
Religion in Peacemaking» in order to illuminate and map out theoretical insights and 
empirical findings of works done in this field of research, as well as to give some 
general recommendations.11 In line with Appleby and Johnston they acknowledge the 
potential and neglect of religion in conflict resolution: «there is an inherent tension 
between features of religions and the orientation of traditional diplomacy» (Harpviken 
& Røislien 2005: 28). In conclusion they assert that there is no clear blueprint for 
brokerage for religious actors. However, they argue that actors who engage in conflicts 
are in need of competence and sensitivity about the cultural and political settings of 
                                                
10 I will draw on this in the theoretical discussion in chapter 3.  
11 In 2005 Tsjeard Bouta, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana and Mohammed Abu-Nimer also produced the report «Faith-Based 
Peace-Building: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors» for Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations. I will also draw on some of their insights in the theoretical outline in chapter 3.   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the conflicts, because: «religion is intimately related to the cultures and political 
systems within which they exist» (ibid: 27). 
Thus, from the studies done in this field I have found three possible knowledge-gaps 
that the thesis sets out to fill.   
First, the discussion of religion’s potential in negotiation and conflict resolution is, 
according to Edward Luttwak, «a continuing project» with only «interim reports» 
(Luttwak 1994: 18). He asserts that International Relations’ rational paradigm and 
traditional notions of diplomacy have led to a «secular reductivism» consequently 
leading us to ignore the phenomenon of religion in conflict resolution (ibid: 8-10). 
Thus the research on religion in peace and conflict remains under-documented or often 
considered as mere opinion as opposed to knowledge (ibid: 17, Harpviken & Røislien 
2008: 222). Ingrid Vik claims that «more systematic and critical studies of the 
influence of religion in peacemaking are conspicuous by their absence» (Vik 2009: 
20). Hence, there seems to be a general knowledge gap in the lack of studies carried 
out to map out how religion, that is, religious institutions, religious tenets, religious 
actors etc., actually function in the process of generating peace.  
Second, a great deal of focus has been placed on religion’s potential for reconciling 
belligerents in a post-conflict context (see Battle 1997, Chapman & Spong 2003, 
Johnston 1994, Helmick & Peterson 2001, Kaufman 2006). However, there seems to 
be a need for scrutiny on how religious actors may function as mediators in an ongoing 
conflict. This applies to conflicts that are secular as well as to those regarded as 
religious, or as having substantial religious undertones.   
Third, the complementary potential for discussing and linking theoretical insights from 
the field of faith-based mediation to the conventional wisdom of traditional conflict-
resolution theory is far from exhausted. The two areas of research should not remain 
isolated and unadjusted. My theoretical discussion and analytic approach tentatively 
attempts to discuss this. However, there is a need to point out areas where future 
research can develop a more profound interdisciplinary approach.   
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Even though the Mozambique case is discussed in earlier works, the negotiation on the 
Algerian case is not adequately covered.12 In addition, a comparison of the two cases 
and their outcomes is also a field of research that has not been covered.  
1.3 Research Method 
I apply a qualitative research strategy based on an interpretive epistemological position 
where the emphasis is on knowing the world through examining «the interpretations of 
that world by its participants» (Bryman 2008: 366).13 In the following I justify my use 
of case study as research method and elaborate upon the central methodological 
considerations and challenges in my approach. 
1.3.1 Case Studies 
The context and scope of the phenomena I scrutinized are complex. The dynamics of 
trust building, communication, and relations developed during negotiations are 
seemingly intertwined and difficult to distinguish. Case study research allows for the 
exploration and in-depth analysis of such complex issues and has a distinct advantage 
when «how and why» are asked about a well-defined historical episode (George & 
Bennet 2005: 18, Zainal 2007: 1-4). Considering this and the fact that many of the 
indicators of faith-based mediation (see chapter 3) are notoriously difficult to count or 
measure statistically, the case study’s ability to give a «detailed consideration of 
contextual factors» (George & Bennet 2005: 19) equips this approach with the greatest 
potential of answering my research questions.  
 
Through my analysis of Sant’ Egidio I have not aimed at gaining external validity, as 
to the degree my findings can be generalized across social settings (Bryman 2008: 
376). Rather I aim at internal validity: «a good match between the researcher’s 
                                                
12 Apart from the mentioned works that discuss the role of religion in peace processes, the negotiations of Mozambique are 
described by Cameron Hume (1994), Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca (2003) and Richard Edis (1995). Mario Giro and Marco 
Impagliazzo (1997) have documented the Algerian negotiations leading up to the Rome Platform.  
13 The ontological basis of qualitative strategies implies that social phenomena are results of the interaction among human 
individuals and not of some exogenous and separated system (Bryman 2008: 366). Considering the perspective of religion’s 
impact on the human and relational aspects of the negotiations, I consider this basis of the qualitative strategy a profitable 
point of departure. 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observations and the theoretical ideas they develop» (ibid: 376). The ability of 
achieving a high level of accordance between the concepts and research observations 
is one asset of the case study (ibid: 376).14  
The qualitative case study approach is also a fruitful method of unveiling the 
procedural patterns in social life (ibid: 388). The setting of negotiations is in fact often 
characterized by individual and collective activities «unfolding over time in context» 
(ibid: 388). Case researchers may therefore be able to analyze how events developed 
(ibid: 388). I thus find the methods of case-research well suited in enhancing internal 
validity.  
1.3.2 Qualitative interviews 
My main source of data collection is a set of interviews.15 The qualitative interview 
has a great advantage in reconstructing events (ibid: 466).16 Interviewing makes it easy 
to be specific in one’s focus and the potential breadth of coverage and the flexibility of 
the qualitative interview open up opportunities for exploring the details and underlying 
concepts of the participants’ worldviews (ibid: 437, 470). This was important in the 
process of mapping out the thoughts and intentions the mediators from Sant’ Egidio 
had during the negotiations, as well as the reflections they made several years later. 
The qualitative interview also reflects the nature of the research-object in a unique way 
by letting it speak. Hence, it bestows on the research-object the possibility of 
protesting against the researcher’s assumptions, questions and interpretations, which 
happened more than once.17 
 
My interviews were semi-structured. Hence I developed an interview-guide with fairly 
specific topics and lists of questions that were addressed (Bryman 2008: 438). I started 
off by letting the interviewees tell their stories and openly reflect on the cases. 
                                                
14 A main preoccupation of qualitative research is «thick descriptions» (Geertz 1977: 6); namely, giving a rich account of 
cultural details (Bryman 2008: 378). The qualitative case-researcher’s sensitivity to, and emphasis on, context is essential in 
producing correct descriptions that form the basis of the analysis of peoples’ behavior and thinking (ibid: 380-387). 
15 The interviews were carried out in both Oslo and Rome. 
16 Johnston has also recognized the need for personal interviews as the most important source of mapping out the actions of 
religious actors in conflict resolution due to the limits of the written records (Johnston 1994: 259). 
17 This expresses loyalty towards the phenomena and consequently reflects the essential nature of the research-object (Kvale 
& Brinkmann 2009: 248-249). 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Throughout the interviews I had to ask certain specific questions regarding my 
theoretical focus. The interviews often led to free discussions, however always within 
the scope of my focus.  
My analysis of the transcribed interviews was that of a theoretical approach. Hence I 
attempted to interpret the statements from the points of view of the different 
theoretical propositions (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 241).18  
 
The persons interviewed during the research were the following: Mario Giro, Head of 
the International Relations Department of Saint’ Egidio and the organizer of the 
Algerian talks; Leonardo Emberti Gialloreti, Coordinator of the Ecumenical and 
Interreligious Department; Mario Raffaelli, former member of the Italian Parliament, 
Italy’s former special envoy to Somalia and one of four mediators in the Mozambique-
talks; Leone Gianturco, secretary of the Mozambique talks; John Pierre Entelis, author 
and professor of Political Science and Director of Middle East Studies Program at 
Fordham University; and Ingrid Vik, historian of religion, and special advisor of the 
Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights.19   
1.3.3 Triangulation 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, I drew on several other sources of data. 
Case study research usually implies collecting data from different sources to create a 
deeper and more accurate understanding for the problem complex to be analyzed 
(George & Bennett 2005: 5). Hence I collected data from several different sources, 
including peace agreements, official documents and reports, books, speeches, research 
articles, and the media. This application of more than one source of data in the study of 
a social phenomenon is often referred to as triangulation (Bryman 2008: 379).  
 
                                                
18 In this tradition the researcher writes his or her interpretations without turning to specific tools of analysis; the theoretical 
insights derived from knowledge of the phenomena make the researcher capable of asking theoretically qualified questions 
(ibid: 242). This had obvious implications for the interview in that I included the theoretical perspectives already in the 
interview-guide in order to detect the desirable information and empiricism needed in the interviews. 
19 In addition to their unique competence and relation to the subject, Raffaelli, Entelis and Vik were also important in order to 
balance the data-collection with people outside Sant’ Egidio.   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1.3.4 Challenges 
My case study was no different from others in terms of the inherent challenges 
concerning preconceptions and personal relations. Bryman asserts that the qualitative 
researcher’s values can impinge on all aspects of the study, from the choice of research 
area and interviewees to the analysis and conclusions (Bryman 2008: 391). A specific 
challenge in my research may have been the relations I developed to the people and 
mediators of Sant’ Egidio during the interviews.  
 
Although the study of Sant’ Egidio might in itself constitute a case, the focus of my 
research requires me to analyze Sant’ Egidio’s methods of mediation in practice. Thus, 
to adequately address the research questions I have chosen two actual peace 
negotiations in which they functioned as mediators.  
1.4 Thesis Outline 
While Chapter 1 has given an introductory account of the thesis’ focus and explored 
the methodological principles and reasons for choosing a qualitative approach with 
emphasis on the qualitative interview, chapter 2 provides an empirical background by 
introducing Sant’ Egidio and the two cases of conflict.  
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical background and epistemological assumptions 
underlying the approach of faith-based mediation and eclectically develops the theory 
applied in the analysis. It also discusses faith-based mediation in relation to other 
approaches to mediation, in order to adequately reveal the complementary and unique 
potential of faith-based mediation. The chapter rounds up with two hypotheses that the 
following two chapters will revolve around. 
The main objective of chapter 4 is to carry out the analysis as to what extent the 
hallmarks of faith-based mediation were present and influential in negotiations in the 
two cases. Here, I discuss the negotiations in light of the four hallmarks of faith-based 
mediation presented in the preceding chapter. The chapter is a discussion of my first 
hypothesis.  
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In chapter 5 I set out to analyse and compare whether or not religion did play a key 
role in the two cases of negotiations. The chapter seeks to answer the second 
hypothesis that centres on this question and why the outcomes of the two cases 
differed.   
Chapter 6 sums up my main findings and conclusions. The chapter also points at 
certain theoretical implications of the analysis and areas for future research.   
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2 Empirical background  
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter introduces Sant’ Egidio’s history, work and the ideas underlying their 
modus operandi. The chapter also highlights the essential course of events in the time 
leading up to Sant’ Egidio’s engagement in both Mozambique and Algeria. Thus, the 
chapter gives a preliminary answer to the first descriptive research question: in what 
ways, if any, did Sant’ Egidio contribute to the conflict resolution in Mozambique and 
the negotiations in Algeria?  
2.2 Sant’ Egidio 
In 1968, a few students of Rome’s Virgil High School started a voluntary charitable 
community committed to social concern for the poor and interreligious dialogue. The 
eighteen-year-old Andrea Riccardi was one of its founders and became the first 
president of the Community, a position he still holds today. A few years after its 
formation, the community received the sixteenth-century convent of Sant’ Egidio in 
the ancient Roman district of Trastevere as a donation from the Vatican. The Italian 
government subsequently renovated the convent, and transformed it into a modern 
complex of meeting rooms, offices and reception areas, after which the community 
took the name of Sant’ Egidio (Appleby 2000: 154-155).  
 
The community was created at a time marked by the profound internal revolution in 
the Catholic Church initiated by The Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965 
(Hume 1994: 15).20 Hence, through their diverse and wide social service network they 
work for the realization of a more just society and attempt to realize the words of Pope 
John XXIII: «The Church is for all, particularly the poor» (saintegidio.org).  
                                                
20 During The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), Pope John Paul XXIII stated the famous words: «Let us seek what 
unites us, not what divides us». It thus revised the Church’s position from Catholic exclusionism and the support of 
authoritarian regimes to one of embracing religious freedom, human rights and democracy – all justified on the grounds of 
multiple traditions within the church (Appleby 2000: 42-50). Hence, it updated its ancient and medieval teachings on the 
sanctity of human nature and embraced a principle «accepted by the common consciousness of men and civilized nations» 
(ibid: 48). 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The religious and spiritual ethos is the foundation of its commitment to peace and 
justice «in solidarity with the poor, and in dialogue» (Appleby 2000: 156). Appleby 
asserts that their commitment must be understood as «inseparable from their identity 
as an ecumenical Catholic community of prayer and fellowship» (ibid: 156). Their 
perspective is both local and global: each local community aspires to serve the poor, 
while also expanding their contacts with other religious and political communities, as 
part of their «worldwide mission» (ibid: 156). The members work in regular jobs; they 
do not take formal vows, only promise to pray together, work for the poor and offer 
friendship to people of every faith or philosophy. This has led them to engage in 
political activities (Hume 1994: 17). Members of the community have extensive 
contacts with the Vatican, the Italian government and several other state leaders 
worldwide (ibid: 17, Appleby 2000: 156). Sant’ Egidio believes that solutions to local 
problems are linked to regional stability and further enhanced by equitable social 
policies. This leads them to lobby and exploit their wide network of political leaders 
and decision-makers in resolving conflicts and providing humanitarian relief (ibid: 
156-157, Johnston 2003: 26).  
 
Leonardo Emberti Gialloreti and Mario Giro explain that Sant’ Egidio emphasises 
above all personal human relations:  
This is why we are not an organization, we are a community. The word community stresses the human 
aspect. You cannot build a community of organizations; it must be a community of people. So all our 
work is based on this idea of personal relations. This aspect helps you to understand the reasons of the 
other. If there is no personal relation, you do not understand, deeply, what the reasons for the other 
peoples’ actions are. (Emberti Gialloreti, 15.12.2009 it. added) 
Sant’ Egidio believes that inter-human aspects such as comprehension, personal 
knowledge of the grassroots, and better understanding of the other peoples’ personal 
biography and feelings, are the only aspects they can add to the realm of international 
relations and realpolitik. This is especially important when interacting with political 
leaders, guerrilla leaders and decision-makers who have the power to alter a situation 
of conflict:   
One of the characteristics of realpolitik, any kind of it, is that realpolitik always leaves a vital part of the 
society behind, namely the people who suffer. Realpolitik is not concerned with people who suffer, and is 
not concerned about the questions that arrive from the people who suffer. This is something that we as 
community would like to add: the voice of the suffering people in each situation. In every political crisis, 
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economic crisis, wars etc. the first to suffer are always the poorest ones. And we want to add this voice. 
We try to bring their voice into the ears of the people who make politics. This is our work, the point with 
our community (ibid). 
 
Hence, although mediation clearly is one of the eye-catching achievements of Sant’ 
Egidio, it is certainly not its only core activity. 
 
Almost all members spend some hours a week either helping the children of poor 
families with their homework, providing food to homeless people, or engaging in other 
similar efforts in order to help deprived people in need. The work with peace is only a 
natural continuation of their efforts to improve the lives of the poor. Thus, when 
summarizing his commitment to conflict resolution, the founder of Sant’ Egidio, 
Andrea Riccardi, stated: “War is the mother of all poverty, which makes everybody 
poor, even the rich” (Marshall 2004: 256).  
The community is currently present in over 70 countries and has approximately 50 000 
members.  
2.3 Mozambique 
October 4, 1992, has been marked as the most important day of Mozambican history. 
A sixteen year civil war, which had left one million dead, was finally put to an end 
after 27 months of negotiations between the government and the insurgency. In a 
region torn by war and internal strife, the Mozambican peace is a ray of hope for many 
African nations.  
2.3.1 Independence 
Mozambique reached its independence in 1975, after ten years of fighting against the 
Portuguese colonial power who had had its armies there since 1498 (Hume 1994: 4). 
However, after the collapse of the Fascists in Portugal, Lisbon determined to grant the 
colony its independence. After 477 years of rule the Portuguese left in a hurry, and left 
the country deprived of most professionals, tradespeople, merchants and skilled 
workers (ibid: 6).  
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The «Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique» (FRELIMO) established a single-party 
regime in Mozambique. The new government initially enjoyed widespread support 
because of its independence struggle, reflecting the post-colonial political experience 
of numerous other newly independent African states (Manning & Malbrough 2009: 
77). In 1975 Samora Machel was sworn in as the new country’s first president, and 
two years later adopted a Marxist-Leninist platform. 
 
The single most important security question facing Machel was the Rhodesian war 
regarding Ian Smith’s white minority rule (Hume 1994: 9). In 1977 Smith’s military 
intelligence started up a Mozambican insurgency movement that was supposed to spy 
on ZANU’s 21 operations and pressure the FRELIMO government. The group 
eventually took the name «Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana» (RENAMO). When 
the initial leader of RENAMO, Andre Matsangaissa, died in fighting with the 
government in 1979, Alfonso Dhlakama became their leader (Hume 1994: 13-14). Led 
on by the Afro-Marxist government of Machel, Mozambique was heavily caught up in 
the geo—political situation in an unstable southern Africa: both the war of 
independence in Rhodesia and the growing contest between the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the South African Defence Forces (Crocker 1994: ix-x).     
 
However, by 1986 the RENAMO guerrillas had taken over most parts of Mozambique, 
to the extent that FRELIMO only controlled the cities. RENAMO had evolved into an 
independent war-machine capable of producing both food and arms. It was seeking to 
destroy the country’s economy and the system of government in order to force 
FRELIMO to negotiate from a position of weakness (Rocca 2003: 43). That same year 
Samora Machel died in a mysterious plane crash in South Africa, and Joaquim 
Chissano, the minister of foreign affairs, took over as president. Perceiving RENAMO 
as a puppet for the South African government, Chissano continued his predecessor’s 
hard line towards the insurgents and hence refused any direct talks or negotiations. 
Thus, Mozambique continued its path to destruction during 1986 and 1987.  
 
                                                
21 The Zimbabwean African National Union was a militant organization that fought the white minority rule in Rhodesia. 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Despite RENAMO’s control and widespread activity, few really knew who they were 
and what they wanted. Even though some European analysts interpreted them as 
something more than criminal guerrillas, the most common conviction was that they 
were a savage military formation (labelled the «Khmer Rouge of Africa»), devoid of 
any political feature, who lived by waging war (Hume 1994: 14, Rocca 2003: 49). 
RENAMO’s international connections were also a mystery. Many theories existed. 
The only reliable fact, however, was that South Africa had been sponsoring them, and 
even though they officially stopped this in 1984, it most likely continued (ibid: 50).  
Moises Venancio asserts that while many other African conflicts were products of the 
superpower rivalry and thus possible to resolve with the end of the Cold War, the 
nature of the Mozambican conflict had eventually become domestic and thus more 
complex. The fact that no one could pressure or manipulate the isolated and desperate 
insurgency of RENAMO complicated matters even further (Venancio 1993: 142). 
2.3.2 African summits 
However, towards the end of 1988, both parties were starting to rethink their options 
and were exploring the possibilities of reaching a settlement through dialogue instead 
of war (Hume 1994: 26). Under Chissano’s leadership, Mozambique’s path towards a 
more liberal policy and reformed economy, which had only just started with Machel, 
continued. It reached its peak on FRELIMO’s fifth party congress in which the 
government affirmed its choice of implementing a multiparty system (Rocca 2003: 
54).22  
 
The first serious initiatives for peace were African, and the parties first considered the 
neighbouring states as mediators. In the summer of 1989 both President Robert 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Daniel Arap Moi from Kenya were asked by 
Chissano to function as mediators (Patel 1993: 120). Chissano also asked several 
Catholic and Protestant leaders to assist the peace process and even asked them to 
arrange a meeting in Nairobi. Sadly, the meeting failed. More, during the autumn of 
                                                
22 This was, however, not well received by RENAMO because they were not let in on the process leading up to it, and were 
still considered «bandidos armadas» by the government (Gianturco 05.02.2010).   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1989, the rest of the African summits went the same way. The only thing that came out 
of it was that the two parties made their own plans for reaching peace. However, the 
plans were mutually refuted. On December 8, 1989, the United States Chargé d’ 
Affaires in Zimbabwe, Edward Fugit, also presented a 7-point plan to Dhlakama. The 
latter furiously refused (ibid: 121-124). The last effort from the African leaders, now 
seated in Malawi June 1990, ended the day it was supposed to begin (Hume 1994: 32). 
One of the main reasons behind the failure of the attempts was the lack of bargaining 
space 23 due to the parties’ commitments to ostensibly irrefutable positions involving 
the lack of recognition of each other. FRELIMO and the US asked for recognition of 
the Mozambican government and a cease-fire. RENAMO saw the government as an 
illegal one-party state and wouldn’t even consider giving up their only means of 
pressure: the fighting (ibid: 23, Rocca 2003: 98, Patel 1993: 122-123). RENAMO’s 
political program was simple, but effective; they were punctiliously resistant about 
everything FRELIMO had done since the first day of independence (Rocca 2003: 53). 
2.3.3 The Catholic Church  
The Catholic Church also had its own initiatives in promoting peace in Mozambique. 
The Church’s cooperation with the colonial power made it a first and obvious target 
for the independence movement (Venancio 1993: 143). However, as most of the white 
priests and bishops left the country during the time of post-independence persecution 
from the Marxist government, the Church started to transform and endorse the new 
values of independence. It ultimately legitimized its existence and presence in the 
country (ibid: 143). The church already had a relation to RENAMO. Many of the 
insurgents professed the Catholic faith, while others, like Dhlakama himself, were 
educated from a young age at Catholic missions (ibid: 144). This was important when 
the Church started voicing its call for peace based on dialogue in 1984 (ibid: 144). 
This was also the year FRELIMO started relaxing its relations to the Church: an 
obvious consequence of the struggle against RENAMO being more important than the 
construction of an exemplary socialistic country (Rocca 2003: 27).  
                                                
23 Bargaining space refers to the range within which acceptable agreements may be reached (Hopmann 1996: 48). 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The Church, who had placed itself in a unique position between the parties by refusing 
to alienate RENAMO and simultaneously seeking better relations with FRELIMO, 
posted the letter «A Paz Que O Povo Quer». It went far in implying that both parties 
had equal moral responsibility for the state of war (Venancio 1993: 144). Sadly, it only 
led to Chissano reemphasising the impossibility of negotiating with RENAMO (Rocca 
2003: 48). However, the improved relations with the FRELIMO government allowed 
for a visit by Pope John Paul II in 1988, after which the government decided to return 
all the property it had expropriated from the church in the 1970s. The visit was, 
according to Venancio, the result of a long process started in 1984 at the headquarters 
of Sant’ Egidio, where a series of meetings had taken place between representatives 
from the Vatican, the Mozambican clergy and FRELIMO (Venancio 1993: 145). 
2.3.4 Sant’ Egidio and Mozambique 
The ties between Sant’ Egidio and Mozambique started with the young Mozambican 
priest Don Jaime Goncalves, who joined the community while he was studying in 
Rome in 1976 (Hume 1994: 17). A year later he had become archbishop of Beira and 
was becoming a visible leader in the young nation. The reason for Sant’ Egidio’s first 
involvement with the country was the government’s restrictive policy towards religion. 
The network and political comprehension of the community was fruitful as they 
facilitated a meeting between the trendsetting leader of the Italian Communist Party, 
Enrico Berlinguer, and Goncalves. After explaining to Berlinguer the situation for the 
religious institutions in Mozambique, Berlinguer used his position to persuade the 
FRELIMO government to remove the tight restrictions against religion (ibid: 17-18, 
Rocca 2003: 23-27). Sant’ Egidio’s work only increased after this. In 1984 they started 
sending both planes and ships with aid to the war-torn country (ibid: 28). During the 
African peace initiatives at the end of the 1980s the community kept on working with 
deepening its familiarity with the two sides to the conflict (ibid: 97). Through 
Goncalves they had established reliable contacts with RENAMO and Andrea Riccardi 
was actually attending FRELIMO’s fifth party congress speaking about a potential 
peace in Mozambique (ibid: 70, 97, Hume 1994: 18). The community, who felt that 
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FRELIMO now wanted peace, later invited Dhlakama to Rome in order to insure 
themselves about his intentions. Despite his deep-seated distrustfulness towards 
FRELIMO, Sant’ Egidio regarded him as a person willing to work for peace (Rocca 
2003: 98-99).  
 
After some to and fro between the parties and Sant’ Egidio, the antagonists finally 
decided to send delegations to the community’s headquarters in Rome July 8, 1990 
(ibid: 103).   
This marked the end of Moi’s and Mugabe’s roles as mediators and marked the start of 
a rather unforeseen path to peace. It was led by Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi 
from Sant’ Egidio, Archbishop Goncalves, and Mario Raffaelli representing the Italian 
government, and supported by ten different governments in addition to the UN (Hume 
1994: x). What followed over the next 27 months were eleven exhausting rounds of 
talks in which there were no «magical» solutions as some might have expected with 
the end of the Cold War rivalry (Rocca 2003: 6). The conflict was in many ways a 
typical African post-independence situation: FRELIMO wanted a ceasefire before 
agreeing on a moderate political reform, RENAMO on the other side wanted a 
completely new constitution before any talk of ceasefire. RENAMO would not yield 
an inch until their physical security, political life, and elections with free democratic 
competition were guaranteed (ibid: 5-6). A breakthrough regarding these positions was 
reached when they signed the Preamble. The Preamble was a document in which 
RENAMO committed to recognize the government under the current legal framework, 
and FRELIMO, on their part, recognized RENAMO’s legitimacy as a political 
movement (ibid: 5).  
 
The most important issues that followed were agreement on the presence and role of 
Zimbabwean forces in the country, arrangement of elections, and agreement on a joint 
military and the security police (SNASP) (Hume 1995: 88-95). Limiting the presence 
and activity of the Zimbabwean army within the Beira and Limpopo corridors and 
establishing a joint verification commission to monitor the agreement solved the first 
issue. Further on, the mediators finally got an agreement that both presidential and 
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parliamentary elections were to be held simultaneously within one year from the 
signing of a peace agreement (ibid: 93). Any constitutional questions had to be dealt 
with before the ceasefire, and the reassurance from the government that the Parliament 
would ratify all reforms and protocols from Rome was agreed on. Thus, by giving the 
negotiators the force of constitutional law, the negotiations slowly went forward (ibid: 
97). With the legitimacy and authority that the presence of the two leaders, Chissano 
and Dhlakama, gave, in addition to the effort and help of observing governments, the 
last technical issues concerning a national army, the secret police and how to run the 
civilian administration between the ceasefire and the upcoming election were solved. 
These problems were mostly worked out by the establishment of commissions, 
composed of both sides in addition to the UN and other governments who monitored 
the transitional solutions, and joint governmental bodies (ibid: 99).  
 
A long and troublesome path to agreement marked by seemingly intractable issues, 
several phases of impasse and many different actors involved, finally came to an end 
after a frenetic shuttle diplomacy by the mediators during the last 48 hours.24  
 
The agreement was signed in the hall of Farnesina in the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on the morning of October 4. The war had taken almost one million lives and 
produced four million internal refugees and 1,7 million refugees abroad. 200 000 
children had been orphaned and the infant mortality rate was 250 per 1000. The 
economy and infrastructure was in ruins (ibid: 216). After the signing of the peace 
agreement the papers were symbolically handed over by Matteo Zuppi to the UN 
secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The so-called ONUMOZ mission initiated 
six months later is today regarded as one of the UN’s success stories on intervention in 
the 1990s (ibid. 221). Despite problems in the early phases of the democratic 
competition between the two former belligerents, the elections consolidated the peace  
 
                                                
24 Up until the last hours Dhlakama was afraid he had not accumulated enough guaranties for RENAMO and was therefore 
hesitant to sign the agreement (Rocca 2003: 208). 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to such a degree that Mozambique still today remains a nation at peace in a region of 
conflict (ibid: 227-229).   
2.4 Algeria 
Even though the region of Maghreb in general, and Algeria in particular, represents a 
rather different context than Mozambique in terms of religion, geography, culture and 
traditions, there are some similar traits: There is the long and costly fight for 
decolonization (1954-1962), hundred of thousands of colonists (the so-called pied-
noirs) who left within weeks and the period of optimism and hope that ensued. Further 
there is the growing malignant form of authoritarian rule carried out by the liberators 
and the subsequent resistance and cry for democratic reforms and multi-party elections 
(Impagliazzo 2010: 1-2). In Algeria however, the resistance did not initially take the 
form of an insurgency movement. Rather, during the 1980s the «crisis of 
authoritarianism» was confronted with society-wide uprisings, strikes, upsurges in the 
civil society and a rise of populist political Islamic movements (Entelis 1997: x).  
2.4.1 Algerian power structure 
Ever since the war of liberation, the army had been considered the legitimacy-granting 
authority in the young nation. The army developed a clientelistic pattern of power in 
keeping control over the government (Addi 1996: 96). Relationships within the power 
structure, Le Pouvoir, were particularistic and based on tribal bonds or material 
interests. Hence, since 1962 there was a lack of formal institutions and independent 
judicial power. The visible civilian government whose legitimacy was drawn from the 
army maintained the prevention of an independent civil society. The army in turn 
controlled the government through the hidden and network-based system of power 
(ibid: 96). The fact that the army did not identify itself with the electorate (which did 
not exist in their eyes) but with the nation, revealed, according to Addi, its nationalistic 
ideology: political conflicts between Algerians did not exist in their view; all conflicts 
were between Algerians and foreigners, or traitors to Algeria and Islam (ibid: 96-98). 
A consequence was that the rule of law proved impossible considering that popular 
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sovereignty is its source. Because loyalty to the army was considered more important 
than doing a good job, misrule, poor distribution of the state’s natural resources and 
widespread corruption was the result (ibid: 99-100, Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 10-11). 
The economic inequality and low oil prices in the 80s consequently led the country 
into more foreign debt and rapidly increasing poverty. As the opposition started to 
grow, the government found itself in a difficult situation without democratic, 
economic, cultural or religious legitimacy. The increasing portion of young Algerians 
among the population also deprived the army of its historic liberating legitimacy 
(Roberts 1995: 251).  
 
The nationwide riot in Algeria in October 1988 is perhaps the best example of the 
reaction to this tendency (Entelis 1997: x). In Algiers, the riots took the increasingly 
illegitimate government by surprise. At a loss, the government decided to send in the 
Armée Nationale Popolaire (ANP), the symbol for their national independence, in 
order to re-establish order. The result was that the people’s army for the first time 
attacked and fired at its unarmed population. A few weeks later, nearly a thousand 
people were killed (Addi 1996: 94). What followed was a brief period in which the 
government party, the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN), ostensibly honoured the 
demands of the people. Under its current prime minister, Mouloud Hamrouche, they 
embarked on a series of constitutional reforms (ibid: 94, Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 
13). The population began organizing and the first political formations were soon 
created. The Movement for Democracy in Algeria (MDA), formed by the country’s 
first independent president, Ahmed Ben Bella while in exile 1984, emerged from the 
underground, as well as Ait Ahmed’s Socialists Forces Front (FFS) who had fought 
for multi-party democracy since the 1960s (ibid: 13-14). Later the FLN separated itself 
from the State and the military in turn abandoned it. On September 14 1989 the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was founded. With its famous slogan «Islam is the 
solution» it soon became the main revolutionary spokesman for the majority of 
unsatisfied and oppressed Algerians. Algeria suddenly had nearly 60 recognized 
parties, and the political landscape of Algeria was in this manner far more complex 
than that of Mozambique. A simple dichotomy between the state and a revolutionary 
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movement didn’t exist, and it was to become even more complicated (Roberts 1995: 
251, Joffé 2009: 943).  
2.4.2 Democratic reforms and coup d’ état 
In a referendum on February 23, 1989, 73,4 percent of the population approved a more 
democratic constitution. It involved a new legislative national assembly composed of 
freely elected members; independent judicial power, obliged to protect the freedom 
and fundamental human rights of each Algerian; individual rights to form political 
associations; and a new freedom of the press (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 15). The first 
free municipal elections were held on June 12, 1990. The FIS won a majority with 
54,25 percent of the votes, followed by the FLN with 28,1 percent. The FIS soon 
assumed administration of almost all the Algerian cities and declared them «cities of 
Islam» (ibid: 19). In 1991 the government decided that the legislative elections were to 
be held in two rounds, coincidentally they also prohibited campaigning inside mosques 
and they declared new electoral precincts. The FIS perceived this as a favouring of the 
FLN. Together with many parties they expressed their opposition. However, 
uninfluenced by the protests, President Chadli Benjedid decided to hold elections on 
June 27. Under the leadership of Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj the FIS announced a 
strike on May 23, and went on to occupy whole squares and streets in Algiers. 
Somehow shooting began and the ANP started taking control over the streets again. 
Within weeks the situation deteriorated: Madani and Belhadj were on the verge of 
declaring a Jihad as a result of a growing manhunt of Islamists and the taking down of 
the inscriptions that declared many Algerian cities Islamic. They were, however, 
arrested before they could execute the order. With the two shuyukh in prison the 
already complex political assembly that the FIS represented started to break off in 
several factions, many of which later developed into militant and terrorist groups (ibid: 
20-24). The military that by now controlled the government decided to postpone the 
legislative elections until December, seemingly confident that the FIS was no longer a 
threat. However, by the efforts of the only leaders left strong enough to hold the party  
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together, Abdelkader Hachani and his right-hand man, Rabah Kebir, the FIS 
announced its participation in the elections (ibid: 25).  
 
The election result was as shocking for the government as for the FIS. The latter won 
with a majority of 47,5 percent, which also meant 188 seats in the national assembly.  
The military or Le Pouvoir acted swiftly: on January 4, 1992, they dissolved the 
National Assembly, and a week later the highest-ranking officer forced Chadli to 
resign. Both Hachani and Kebir were arrested. On January 14, a five-member Higher 
State Council led by the newly returned liberation-hero Mohammed Boudiaf took 
control of the state. The FIS was soon outlawed and all their regional authorities were 
dissolved (ibid: 29). The country leaped into a state of terror. Clashes between the 
«éradicateurs»25 wing of the military and the violent and militant remnants of the FIS 
and other Islamist factions became tragically common. During the following three to 
four years more than 60 000 people lost their lives (Addi 1996: 94).  
 
During the rest of 1992 and 1993 there were some tentative attempts at dialogue 
between the FLN and FFS and the «conciliators» in the state apparatus. They did not, 
however, lead to anything (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 29). On January 31, 1994, the 
newly appointed minister of defence, Liamin Zeroual, was, despite, and coincidentally 
because of, the absence of any institutional point of reference, upgraded to «president 
of the state» (ibid: 29). In spite of his attempts to dialogue sans exclusive aucune – to 
negotiate with all parties - real dialogue never began. Both the Islamic extremists and 
the eradicators of the military saw to this (ibid: 30, Roberts 1995: 257-259).  
2.4.3 Sant’ Egidio and Algeria 
Sant’ Egidio, who had nurtured their strong relations to the country and especially the 
Algerian Church since 1984, decided in 1994 to evaluate the possibilities for an 
Algerian peace initiative. This was the result of the tragic assassinations of two friends 
of the community working in Algeria, and an informal, but concrete proposal to the 
                                                
25 The factions within the Algerian power structure that opposed dialogue with the Islamists and rather pursued a tactic of 
oppression or extermination were generally referred to as «éradicateurs» (eradicators).   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community’s leader, Riccardi, from some Algerian Muslims at an interreligious 
conference for peace in Asissi (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 49, Impagliazzo 2010: 6). 
The situation for both the civilians in general, and those who professed a different faith 
than Islam in particular, was at the time severely deteriorated. A group composed of 
Matteo Zuppi, Marco Impagliazzo, Mario Marazziti and Mario Giro decided to contact 
various members of the government and the most important parties representing the 
Algerian community (Giro 16.12.2009). Somewhat surprisingly, most of the parties 
accepted the invitation, even the FIS. 
 
Thus, the first round of talks, Colloque sur Algérie, was held in Rome, at Sant’ 
Egidio’s headquarters, November 21-22, 1994. With the blessing of the two shuyukh, 
Madani and Belhadj, the FIS was represented by Anwar Haddam. In addition, the 
following were also present: the FLN secretary, Abdelhamid Mehri; the FFS president, 
Ait Ahmed; Ahmed Ben Bella for the MDA; Ali Yahia, lawyer and president of the 
Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH); Abdallah Jaballa, the 
president of the movement Islamic rebirth Ennahada; Mahfoud Nahnah, the head of 
the Movement for Islamic Society-Hamas; Noureddine Boukrouh, the founder of the 
Party for Algerian Renewal (PRA); Ahmed Ben Mohammed for Jeunesse Musulmane 
Contemporaine (JMC); and finally, Louisa Hanoune, the only woman and the 
spokesperson for the Worker’s Party (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 53, Impagliazzo 
1998).  
 
The interest in the talks and the future of Algeria was revealed by the fact that more 
than 250 international journalists gathered outside the headquarters on Piazza de Sant’ 
Egidio. From the outset the community did not intend real negotiations (as they 
thought it ought to take place in Algeria), but merely a space for the parties to talk and 
discuss their different ideas on how to solve the situation (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 
48-49). All of Algeria’s major parties were invited and present, except for the 
government. It declined the invitation by strongly criticising the effort as an 
intervention in their country, and claimed that there actually was dialogue going on in  
 27 
Algeria (though the last attempt on national dialogue had failed in October) (ibid: 55, 
Impagliazzo 2010: 7).  
2.4.4 The Talks 
During the discussions there seemed to be consensus on the condemnation of violence 
and the need for dialogue. In addition there were also concrete proposals on what 
would be needed in order to establish a democratic regime in the country. Outside, 
reactions were divided. The fairly positive reception from certain European countries 
was met with fierce criticism from the Algerian media and government. Government-
controlled newspapers in Algiers (e.g. the El Moudjahid) labelled the participants 
terrorists, traitors and mercenaries. The event was frequently linked to both the US 
and the Vatican and ridiculed as a Christian intervention in an Islamic nation 
(Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 78-82). When asked to give a statement by Italian 
journalists the current Prime Minister, Mohammed Sifi, declared: «Algeria is not like 
Haiti, the Algerians will never allow anyone to interfere» (ibid: 84). Aware of the 
criticism from the government and the state-controlled newspapers in Algeria, Ahmed 
Ben Bella replied on the last day of the first colloque with these words: «The 
government has scolded us for coming to Rome “in the Vatican’s shade”. […] You 
have no right to suspect our patriotism. Ait Ahmed and I certainly cannot be accused 
of lacking in patriotism for Algeria. […] We have not come here to plot against 
someone, but because we believe in the necessity of dialogue, which we have not been 
able to establish for months» (ibid: 79).  
 
The final communiqué that everyone signed, except the Hamas and the PRA, declared 
that there was a need to continue the discussion and receive free and constant access to 
information about the crisis. The communiqué also made a formal request to Sant’ 
Egidio to persevere in its effort to offer a place for further dialogue when the 
conditions permitted (ibid. 79, Roberts 1995: 259).  
 
As the terror continued to the brink of civil war in the weeks after the first colloque, 
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Ait Ahmed consulted with the other parties and requested another encounter in Rome 
to discuss a strategy that would lead to real negotiations (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 
109). Mandani and Belhadj, signalled that they were in favour and were even willing 
to guarantee alternation of power, a multi-party system and certain other democratic 
rights.  
 
On January 8, 1995, the Algerian political leaders met behind closed doors at a secret 
location in Rome. They immediately started to work on concrete political proposals in 
line with the expectations from their first encounter (ibid: 112). Even though the 
debate was sometimes animated and heated because of the wide span of political 
positions held by the actors, they all enjoyed equal stature around the negotiation table 
(ibid: 116). The first day they discussed how to assume further negotiations with the 
regime, its role in the future Algeria, the constitutional foundations for the new 
elections, and how to engage the civil society and a free press in the peace process 
(ibid: 114-119, Giro 16.12.2009). At the request of Sant’ Egidio, Mandani and Belhadj 
sent a letter to map out the most important points for the FIS in the negotiations. The 
letter emphasised among other things that the illegal regime had lost both its 
revolutionary and constitutional legitimacy and that Europe now had the chance to end 
the war. It also listed several conditions that had to be met for negotiations to take 
place (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 121-123).  
 
As the days went by and discussions moved forward, the FIS started to modify their 
conditions and accepted its position as being one faction among many. They 
eventually agreed on drafting a national pact that emphasised that no foreign entity 
would be asked to intervene in order to reach a pacific and democratic solution to the 
crisis. Sections B and C in the Rome Platform suggested a realistic step-by-step 
restoration of peace and order in addition to requesting negotiations rather than merely 
dialogue with the government (The Rome Platform). The document excluded no one 
in the political competition, which would ensue the agreement. Even though betrayed 
and cheated of the election victory in 1992, the FIS agreed that the group would not 
invoke punishment for the ones responsible for the coup d’état. They insisted on the 
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legal rehabilitation of the FIS, the release of the FIS leaders, and the annulling of the 
last election, as new elections would be worked out. In the end, the FIS accepted both 
democratic and human rights that had never been included as part of its program or 
tradition (ibid: 133-137, Roberts 1995: 261). The group also suggested a transitional 
legislation, a «National Conference» composed of members from both the regime and 
the political opposition.  
 
On Friday, January 13, the group met with the international press for the signing 
ceremony (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 154). According to the FFS president, Ait 
Ahmed, he was sure that «our efforts will lead to peace» (ibid: 155). And even though 
the Platform secured major concessions from the FIS, did not pillory the current 
regime, and was praised by many European observers (ibid: 166-172), it stands today 
only as a «lost opportunity» (Entelis 02.12.2009). Despite their initial support the most 
important governments did not follow up on the initiative taken by the Rome group. 
The regime rebuked the effort and pressed on with its own presidential election as a 
way of disarming the democratic critique the Platform represented (Roberts 1995: 
237). Coincidentally, the killings continued. To date, the army’s lengthy efforts to 
marginalize the Islamist movements do not seem to mend their fundamental Achilles’ 
heel, which is the unresolved conflict associated with the 1991-92 elections and their 
ongoing legitimacy crisis (Akacem 2004: 156).   
2.5 Summary 
The chapter presented the empirical background of the thesis. Sant’ Egidio is a 
community of Catholics who through their emphasis on human relations and work 
with the poor have developed a wide network that proves fruitful in terms of working 
for peace. The story of Mozambique was also presented. The country was split by a 
terrible civil war between the FRELIMO government and the RENAMO insurgency. 
After many failed efforts, Sant’ Egidio and certain helpful governments were able to 
bring the war to an end in October 1992. The Algerian case on the other hand did not 
end with peace. After the coup d’état in 1992, the country leapt into a state of terror 
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where civilians eventually became the main targets. Even though Sant’ Egidio 
managed to bring all the most important opposition parties together, the effort did not 
bring the conflict to an end. 
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3 Theoretical background and new approaches 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter provides a theoretical account of mediation and the hallmarks of faith-
based mediation. It also discusses some of the ways faith-based mediation deviates 
from more traditional notions of mediation and negotiation, and how it concurs with 
other approaches. I also develop two hypotheses around which I will centre the two 
chapters of analysis. The hypotheses are a continuation of the research questions.    
3.2 Mediation 
Although conflict is, without doubt, one the most pervasive and costly of all social 
processes, it is also one of the most common and prevailing in all societies (Bercovitch 
& Gartner 2008: 4, Moore 1996: 3). «Conflict is not necessarily bad, abnormal, or 
dysfunctional; it is a fact of life» (ibid: xiii). However, conflicts are not bound to 
follow a negative and violent course. Conflicts arise, according to Moore, when parties 
are engaged in competition to meet goals that are perceived as incompatible and when 
these divergent goals motivate our behaviour (ibid: 3, Bercovitch et. al 2009: 5). 
However, conflict can be solved if the parties are able to devise efficient procedures 
for cooperative problem-solving, lay aside distrust and animosity, and work for 
solutions that attempt to meet all the involved parties’ interests (More 1996: xiii). This 
process in which the parties seek a relation with competing actors in order to achieve 
something they cannot obtain by other means, is the most regular way of reaching a 
solution and is usually referred to as negotiation.26 Thus, there is always a combination 
of common and conflicting interests in that each party proposes different solutions to a 
common problem (Hopmann 1996: 25). The game-theoretic foundation of negotiations 
proposes two main points. First, each party will continue to negotiate and accordingly 
increase their joint payoffs until they reach the Pareto frontier. Second, at the Pareto 
                                                
26 Parties in a conflict enter negotiations when they voluntarily join in on a temporary relationship «designed to educate each 
other about their needs and interests, to exchange specific resources, or to resolve less tangible issues such as the form their 
relationship will take in the future or the procedure by which problems are to be solved» (Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 8). In 
addition, negotiations are sought when both parties are aware that alternatives to a negotiated settlement do not appear as 
viable or desirable as a bargain that they reach themselves (ibid: 13). 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frontier it is impossible for one party to improve its position without the other losing, 
the parties will thus bargain over which point on the Pareto frontier they will agree on 
(ibid: 46-47).  
However, direct negotiations, in all levels of life and politics, may reach an impasse or 
even worse: not get started at all. Hopmann claims that in some cases a dispute may 
become so bitter that any solution becomes difficult to find bilaterally. An outside 
intervention might be fruitful for helping the negotiations along (ibid: 222). The 
situation in which the parties seek a third party for assistance in reaching a mutually 
acceptable solution is termed mediation. Jakob Bercovitch claims that negotiation and 
mediation are at last beginning to emerge as the most appropriate response to conflict 
in our diverse and constant challenge of building a more peaceful world (Bercovitch 
2009: 353).  
Mediation is, according to Moore, an extension of the negotiation process that involves 
intervention by an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-
making power (Moore 1996: 8). Thus, mediation leaves the decision-making authority 
primarily in the hands of the parties to the conflict. «It is predicated on the need to 
supplement conflict management, not to supplant the parties’ own efforts» (Bercovitch 
& Gartner 2008: 5). The possibility of retaining the decision-making authority is what 
makes mediation especially attractive to many countries (Moore 1996: 18). The 
intervention is non-violent and non-binding and mediators enter a conflict in order to 
affect it, resolve it or influence it in some way (Bercovitch 2009: 343).  
Bercovitch and Gartner assert that mediation is particularly fruitful in international 
relations when a conflict has gone on for some time and reached an impasse or 
stalemate: when neither party tolerates further escalation of the dispute, when they are 
prepared to meet directly or indirectly for dialogue and when they are prepared to 
accept external help and surrender some control over the resolution process 
(Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 6). In addition to the motivating factor of a mutually 
hurting stalemate, Zartman notes that valid spokesmen and a perceived way out are 
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important for creating optimism about a possible solution and incentives for accepting 
mediation (Pruit 1997: 237-238).27 
3.3 Faith-based mediation  
With the end of the Cold War and in the face of new types of destructive conflicts, the 
field of conflict resolution has expanded and developed. The attention given to non-
governmental organizations and grassroots engagement has grown concurrently 
(Kriesberg 2009: 25). The theories on faith-based mediation erupted in this period as 
well. As pointed out earlier, this thesis’ focus is on the practice of religious actors 
involved as mediators in conflicts. The focus does not restrict itself to only «religious» 
or «identity» wars (see point 3.3.2). Appleby asserts that the most direct and decisive 
involvement by religious actors in conflict resolution is when they started providing 
good offices and served effectively as mediators (Appleby 2000: 216). Historically, he 
claims, mediation also seems to be the most common form of religious intervention 
and perhaps the most productive (ibid: 239). Further, he asserts that just as insights 
from social psychology have strengthened the literature on mediation, the psychology 
of religion can also be drawn upon to solve conflicts: «faith can form a powerful 
connection between the adversaries or between mediators and one or more of the 
parties they seek to reconcile» (ibid: 218).  
Vik and Appleby agree that the legacy of religious peacemaking is today both wide-
ranging and complex (Vik 2009: 20, Appleby 2000: 5-6). A diversity of actors is 
working on different levels and with different goals.28 Based on my eclectic discussion 
of the theories on the field, my tentative definition of faith-based mediation is «a 
process in which a religious third party applies elements and practices of religion in 
order to resolve a conflict».      
                                                
27 Moore further elaborates on a conflict’s ripeness for mediation and adds that it is likely when emotions are intense and are 
preventing a settlement, communication between the parties is poor in quantity or quality, misperceptions or stereotypes are 
hindering exchanges, serious disagreements over information or when there is no acceptable structure or forum for 
negotiations (Moore 1996: 13-14). 
28 Appleby mentions several actors: Christian ethicists attempt to implement the pacifist traditions in contingent political 
contexts; Muslim jurists working for just and stable Muslim societies; Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu scholars who «translate» 
the insights of their traditions to an accessible and common «second-order language» of dialogue; religious movements, 
NGOs and leaders who are engaging themselves in conflict transformation and reconciliation (Appleby 2000: 6). 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Appleby defines religion in sum as «the human response to a reality perceived as 
sacred» (ibid: 8): it discloses and celebrates the transcendent source and significance 
of human existence. He states that religion implies a code of conduct that defines the 
explicit moral norms governing the behaviour of those who belong to the confessional 
community. «Thus, religion constitutes an integral culture, capable of forming 
personal and social identity and influencing subsequent experience and behaviour in 
profound ways» (ibid: 9). In my discussion I am concerned with the functionalist 
approach to religion: not what religion is, but what it does for a social group or 
individual (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 353).  
One may define Sant’ Egidio as a religious actor in that they have been formed by a 
religious community and are acting with the intent to uphold, extend, or defend its 
values and precepts. All their work, both with the poor and with peace, is derived from 
their religious background (Emberti Gialloreti 15.12.2009). This also points to what 
Bercovitch asserts is a crucial and often neglected question in the field of conflict 
resolution: namely, the mediator’s motivation, why mediate? (Bercovitch 2009: 345). 
Peacemaking and mediation are all about upholding Sant’ Egidio’s values. For them 
mediation is not about stabilizing the economy or a question of security. Their 
arguments are drawn from their community’s sacred texts, precepts, and ethical 
practices. These in turn shape the concrete choices and behaviour of the members of 
the community (Appleby 2000: 282).  
There are several aspects worth illuminating in the theoretical field of faith-based 
peacemaking; I have, however, demarcated it in four main hallmarks in order to 
emphasize the essential characteristics pertinent to mediation. My eclectic account of 
the theoretical propositions of faith-based mediation will also discuss traditional and 
new approaches to negotiation and mediation in order to illuminate the particularity of 
the approach.  
3.3.1 The new vision and increased common ground based on religious principles  
One of the faith-based mediator’s unique ways of intervention is the encouragement of 
embracing a new reality and a new relationship with one another (Johnston 2003: 18). 
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The deconstruction of old hostile perceptions and the appeal to the transcendent 
dynamics of religious principles form a basis from which even the worst enemies may 
be reconciled by seeing the situation differently, claim Harpviken and Røislien 
(Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 360-361, Johnston 2003: 18). The religious peace broker 
draws on normative rationales for restraining armed conflict in a manner that exceeds 
traditional diplomacy and implies long-term commitment (Harpviken & Røislien 
2005: 18). However, this is contingent on the parties’ willingness to shift perceptions 
and their sense of dependence on religion (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 362). Building 
bridges for enhanced communication, establishing new common ground and forging 
unity out of diversity by appealing to the sacred texts and shared spiritual principles of 
religion is part of this first characteristic (Johnston 2003: 16-17).  
 
This first point breaks with the traditional understanding of holding and keeping one’s 
positions based on one’s primary rational interests. The embrace of «new realities» 
based on normative rationales derived from sacred texts is unfamiliar to traditional 
diplomacy. Douglas Johnston, the President of the US International Centre for 
Religion and Diplomacy, asserts that the post-cold-war world is likely to see the 
composition of conflict change (Johnston 1994: 3). These new conflicts pose a 
challenge for the existing theories on conventional diplomacy, he adds. Traditional 
diplomacy involves measures that are suitable for power politics and tangible material 
interests: interests that are inherently divisible and subject to compromise (ibid: 3). 
Michael Banks asserts that the conventional models of conflict resolution, derived 
from the Cold War paradigm of international relations, tend to facilitate a status quo 
mentality that instead of promoting an impartial mediation conveys a partisan 
manipulation of conflicts (Banks 1986: 24).29 Indeed, the fundamental assumptions 
underlying the theoretical framework of negotiations and mediation have, since the 
end of the Second World War, been dominated by «rational actor» models (Atran & 
Axelrod 2008: 224). Such models imply that the mediator can, by using various 
                                                
29 Banks contends the international relations paradigm contains an inherent liability regarding conflict resolution. Diplomacy 
typically attempts to resolve conflicts according to a patent interest, not make concessionary adjustments wherever possible 
(Banks 1986: 24-25). 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combinations of power, manipulate the range of possible agreements (Carnevale 1986: 
42, see section 3.4.2). The termination of conflict is dependent on many things; 
however, Mitchell emphasises the parties’ rational evaluation of their position of 
relative advantage in the ongoing conflict and the structure of the parties themselves 
(Mitchell 1981: 166). Following this, the process becomes a cost-benefit analysis in 
which the gains associated with continued fighting are compared to the gains 
associated with giving in, and the costs incurred through continuing the war compared 
to the suffering induced by compromise (ibid: 166-172).  
Even though undeniably fruitful during the Cold War, these models reduced human 
reasoning to purely rational calculation where decision-making occurred in some 
calculated centralized manner (Johnston & Samson 1994: 27, Atran Axelrod 2008: 
224, Mitchell 1981: 159).30  
The logical result of this line of thought in an encounter with so-called «sacred» or 
«core» values, often related to religion, is inaction (Carnevale 1986: 51).  
Conventional wisdom, presupposing rational actors, suggests that the mediator either 
postpone the issue of sacred values, or bypass it with sufficient material incentives 
(Atran & Axelrod 2008: 223). However, actors influenced by these values often find 
the attempt to bypass them with material incentives offending, and it might decrease 
the possibility of achieving sustainable peace (ibid: 226).   
Mario Giro, on the other hand, states that «when you are a believer you believe that a 
man can change. Even the worst of men has something good inside» (Giro 
16.12.2009). Sant’ Egidio understands war as a human question. War and peace are 
not automatic outputs of some mechanical equation or process (ibid.). Consequently 
the community believes that the decision to wage war can be reversed even if 
economic, societal and structural factors might ostensibly point to more war. As such, 
they believe more in humanity than in rational calculation. Even though they admit the 
importance of structural factors and that these also must be solved, they still hold that 
                                                
30 Mitchell labels the analogy of the «rational actor» an «anthropomorphic metaphor» and notes that nowhere is it more 
applied than in international conflicts, and nowhere is it probably less appropriate (Mitchell 1981: 159). Nevertheless, the 
analogy still stands as a common metaphor and lies as a fundamental strand of thought underlying the traditional theory in the 
field of negotiations (ibid: 162). 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the human level needs to be addressed first. Thus, they emphasise each guerrilla-
leader’s, president’s or general’s personal biography in order to understand the causes 
of war. The people who wage war must be addressed as human beings. And faith-
based actors believe that one of the surest ways to the heart of people is through their 
faith (Johnston 2003: 3). If the decision-makers can change, Sant’ Egidio believes that 
the seemingly mutually incompatible goals underlying a conflict may more easily be 
solved.   
3.3.2 The mediator’s position and identity 
The mediator himself is an important asset to faith-based mediation. An aspect rarely 
acknowledged by secular Western mediators is that when mediating in deeply 
religious societies they are perceived primarily as Christians, even if they don’t 
identify themselves as such (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 366). Faith-based diplomats, 
on the other hand, are extremely aware of their own role and identity, Johnston claims. 
The focus on exclusive and defining aspects of identity in ethnic and religious 
conflicts requires the awareness of identity and the quality of a pluralistic heart in the 
mediator (ibid: 363, Johnston 2003: 17). In addition, another traditional hallmark is the 
ability to persevere against overwhelming odds. This faith-based motivation stems 
from the fact that faith-based mediators perceive peacemaking as a deeply religious 
calling (Bouta et. al 2005: ix). Considering that faith-based mediators have no coercive 
or rewarding means to influence the parties, the time-aspect is even more important. In 
composition with a certain spiritual authority, the credibility of religious institutions 
and the legitimacy related to the humanitarian record of many religious institutions 
constitute the reason why their credibility surpasses that of secular diplomats, 
Harpviken and Røislien note (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 16-18). As Appleby states: 
«Their daily contact with the masses, long record of charitable service, and reputation 
for integrity have earned religious leaders and institutions a privileged status and an 
unparalleled legitimacy, especially in societies where religion enjoys a measure of 
independence from the state» (Appleby 2000: 8). Harpviken and Røislien deem this 
aspect within the organizational potential of religion. In many religious societies the 
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individual’s dependence on different religious organizations and groups gives the latter 
a pervasive status and influence in the community and a unique leverage for 
reconciling conflicting parties, not to mention how their organizational structure 
enables them to draw on local, national and international support for peace-talks 
(Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 21-22).  
Religious actors’ influence in society, wide networks and persistent attitudes make 
faith-based mediation pertinent not only in religious or ethnic conflicts (Bouta et. al 
2005: 44-45). Harpviken and Røislien assert that faith-based mediation has proven 
itself pertinent in secular conflicts as well: by representing a new and alternative 
common ground, as touched upon in the first point (Harpviken & Røislien 1, 19, 24-
25). Indeed, during the nineties, Appleby explains, there was an increasing diversity in 
the tasks religious actors conducted in the name of peacebuilding (Appleby 2000: 827-
828).31  
Giro stresses that a common phenomenon in Europe is to hide your own roots, be that 
socially, ideologically or religiously, because the display of them is seen as lack of 
respect for others’ views (Giro 16.12.2009). In mediation the contrary is essential, he 
claims: «The other wants to know who you really are. Because identity is so 
important, please display your identity so I can understand who I am talking to» (ibid, 
it. added). He asserts that Sant’ Egidio’s unambiguous identity and the fact that they 
do not represent any other states or interests are very important in gaining belligerent 
parties’ trust.  
3.3.3 Healing of relationships and collective wounds  
Faith-based mediators emphasize the relationship between belligerents as much as they 
value a successful settlement. Mediation is seen as a means to bring the conflict to an 
end, but also to resolve the underlying conflict caused by unhealthy relationships 
(Johnston 2003: 19). This includes healing the wounds of history inflicted by identity-
                                                
31 Appleby says of peacebuilding: «at the heart of peacebuilding is conflict transformation, the replacement of violent with 
nonviolent means of settling disputes.» (Appleby 2000: 212).  
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based suppressing institutions. As long as these wounds can give rise to stereotyping 
and demonizing of the perpetrators, conflict continues, Johnston claims. By what he 
labels «spiritual conversation» and the effort of bringing meaning and dignity to the 
parties’ suffering, faith-based mediators are able to penetrate the heart of the conflict 
and uncover values that can form a basis for lasting peace (ibid: 19). In this manner 
faith-based mediators emphasise the altering of the belligerent’s attitudes as more 
important than the parties’ behaviour.  
The parties’ identities are potentially an essential element as well. Religion is in many 
cases the foundation underlying their identity, often intertwined with other 
distinguishing aspects such as ethnicity, class etc. (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 19). 
Harpviken and Røislien claim the religious mediator detects these inflammable 
religious differences and might even point out common values among the conflicting 
parties. They thus operate on different grounds than the traditional diplomats who, 
because of the secular premises underlying their modus operandi, often ignore this 
(ibid: 20).  
3.3.4 Informal Track Two approaches  
Finally, faith-based mediation is characterized by unofficial and informal talks, called 
Track Two (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 361). The aforementioned aspects of identity 
and position open up the possibilities for Track Two approaches. In Track One 
negotiations, the mediators are formally appointed by the parties and ought to be some 
kind of state representative or diplomat. However, informal contexts give the 
mediators more room to manoeuvre outside the limelight of media, and they might 
therefore find themselves better positioned to discuss innovative solutions (ibid: 361). 
As Harpviken and Røislien put it, «lack of official status, however, is not the same as 
lack of relevance» (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 23).   
3.4 The «Human» approach 
It is possible to demarcate certain distinct aspects of faith-based mediation by applying 
the triadic conflict structure from Mitchell that highlights the multiple nature of 
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international conflict. The conflict triangle distinguishes between three inter-related 
components of conflict: conflict situation; conflict behaviour; and conflict attitudes 
and perceptions (Mitchell 1981: 16).  
3.4.1 Attitudes, perceptions and faith 
While some mediators mainly pursue the conflict situation, which is any situation 
where parties perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals (based on 
conflicting interests), one can argue that faith-based mediators emphasise the 
psychological roots to a conflict: attitudes.32 These are psychological states (fear, 
perceptions, anger, hostility etc.) that usually accompany situations of conflict and 
unhealthy relationships (ibid: 27). Even though the conflict situation may have 
changed, attitudes might still hinder peace-attempts. Just as faith-based mediators 
believe that people can change for the better in a situation of conflict, they believe 
repentance is still important in a situation in which the conflict has cooled down, 
because they believe conflict initially begins in the minds and hearts of people. On the 
other hand, Sant’ Egidio also believes that even when the incompatibly of belligerents’ 
goals persists, an alteration of attitudes during mediation may lead to a peaceful 
approach to these incompatible goals (Gianturco 05.02.2010). In either case, the way 
around attitudes and feelings, or the «human approach» as Giro labels it (Giro 
16.12.2009), is the primary objective. Often, the incompatibility of goals and the 
psychological conditions are inter-related. However faith-based mediators have a point 
of reference that stresses the latter aspect. On this point faith-based mediation deviates 
from the traditional interest-based approach that mostly stresses the conflict situation 
as the generator of conflicting behaviour. Consequently, interest-based approaches 
emphasise that the alteration of the situation changes the incentives of conflict and the 
conflicting behaviour.        
                                                
32 In this manner it can be argued that faith-based mediation is theoretically adjacent to psychology- and perception theories 
on conflict, as they emphasise and draw on similar theoretical notions and dynamics (see Mitchell 1981, part I and II). The 
emphasis on attitudes and relationships is also in line with John Paul Lederach’s thesis of comprehensive peacebuilding (see 
Lederach 1997). 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Indeed, Johnston and Samson claim that «identity-based» conflicts require a broader 
approach than conventional diplomacy has contributed: Mediators need to include 
perceptions, emotional stakes, and the party’s respective interpretations of principles 
such as freedom, justice and self-determination; move beyond the state-centric focus 
of power-politics models; and reach into the realm of nongovernmental and individual 
relations (Johnston & Samson 1994: 3, 333).33 Bercovitch claims that the end of the 
Cold War and the ever-increasing number of ethnic and internal conflicts proved the 
old techniques of deterrence and power-politics to be less relevant and simultaneously 
provided opportunities for a significant expansion in the use of mediation as a means 
for conflict resolution (Bercovitch 2009: 353). 
Another idea behind religious peacemaking is its potential in those intractable conflicts 
often referred to as «identity-wars». Kaufman claims that the reason why traditional 
approaches to negotiations usually fail in the new types of wars is the mediator’s 
disregard of how emotional, symbolic and religious dynamics influence the tangible 
and political issues (Kaufman 2006: 202-203). If the roots of a conflict do not revolve 
around material interests, but rather emotional or religious symbols, solutions to these 
are not to be found within the rational paradigm of realpolitik (ibid: 201, Johnston 
2003: ix). Herein lies one of the assets and modus operandi of Johnston’s faith-based 
diplomacy: When religion was perceived as an irrational phenomenon, it was outside 
the rational actor models, and thus outside the policy makers’ calculus (Johnston 2003: 
xi). Johnston, on the other hand, asserts that religion is a strong motivating factor for 
human action, and that people may rationally try to pursue their religious interests. It 
thus represents an important factor in war and peace (Johnston 2003: x, 6-9).34 Hence, 
adherents of faith-based mediation hold that faith is one of many important factors that 
drive action, and contrary to more traditional rational approaches, one can thus 
approach people in conflict through their faith (ibid: 3).    
                                                
33 Identity politics is at the centre of what Michael Sheenan has labelled «postmodern war» (Baylis et. al 2007: 62). These 
wars are increasingly domestic and pursue ethnic cleansing or religiously constituted goals, so-called holy wars (ibid: 62, Fox 
& Sandler 2004: 63). 
34 In this manner faith-based mediators are «culturally sensitive» (Hopmann 1996: 143). Hopmann explains that «culturally 
sensitive» actors in negotiation are aware of the significance of religious and cultural beliefs held by other parties, and that 
the Western notion of «rationality» is itself a cultural-bound value that wont necessarily be easily transferred to other cultures 
(ibid: 143). 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3.4.2 Lack of manipulative means 
The traditional interest-based approach, mentioned in section 3.3.1, proposes that a 
solution depends on the parties’ interests that may be sketched out along a single 
continuum with opposing positions at each end (Hopmann 1996: 76). Hopmann 
explains that throughout much of history, diplomats have generally followed their 
narrow national interests and emphasized bargaining-strategies for «winning» over the 
opponent (ibid: 28). This may lead to a conflict behaviour in which the parties, through 
different means of bargaining, threats and promises, attempt to make the other party 
abandon or modify its goals (ibid: 77, Mitchell 1981: 120). One party may try to put 
the other party «in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice we 
demand», to quote Clausewitz (ibid: 123). In such a situation mediators may play a 
role only when the time is right: when there is uncertainty concerning the relative 
power-balance. Because of the possibility of forcing the other party, few make any 
concessions from a position of strength. However, rarely is a concession given from a 
position of relative weakness, either, due to the fear of exploitation (ibid: 282). Hence, 
there are stages in any dispute where even the most beautifully handled mediation has 
little chance of being taken up. That is, unless you are in a position to manipulate the 
negotiations and create bargaining space by altering the incentives of the parties 
through offering or threatening with tangible tools like economic compensations or 
sanctions and military threats; reward power or coercive power, as Carnevale labels it 
(Carnevale 1986: 42, Mitchell 1981: 286). This thought of manipulation is in line with 
the traditional rational paradigm of negotiation (Beardsley et. al 2006: 64, Hopmann 
1996: 241). 
However, Mitchell acknowledges, this paradigm of «carrots and sticks» fails to 
account for the efforts in conflict mediation to influence not the behaviour, but the 
values underlying that behaviour (Mitchell 1981: 141). Conflict settlement that aims at 
altering the conflict behaviour (stopping the use of violence and coercive strategies) 
may shed little effort in altering the goals and attitudes of the adversaries. It may 
consequently leave the underlying problem unmodified (ibid: 275-276). The powerful 
mediators construct, or even impose, temporary settlements that hinge on the coercive 
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potential of the third-party: not the willingness of the parties. This is the inevitable 
conclusion of the underlying idea, namely that the mediator’s interests clash with those 
of the parties because the parties are inherently reluctant to jeopardize their own 
freedom of action and pursue goals set by their own chosen means (ibid: 312).35  
Hence, Mitchell envisages a new style of mediation in which the assumptions of the 
antagonistic nature of the parties’ relationship and situation, let alone the pure 
bargaining approach which characterizes traditional mediation, is modified (ibid: 313). 
By low power and persuasion the mediator’s function becomes one of education where 
the goal becomes to reconceptualise the parties’ relationship and the problem so that it 
is regarded as a situation from which mutually beneficial solutions can be developed 
(ibid: 313).  
Faith-based mediation follows the rationale behind this approach. Faith-based 
mediation relaxes the proposition about the non-interchangeability of the parties’ 
evaluations of interests and outcomes. Where manipulative strategies downplay the 
dimension of conversation, like the non-violent philosophy of Ghandi and the 
«friendly persuasion» of the Quakers (Mitchell 1981: 141), faith-based approaches 
open up a new frontier by attempting to alter the values underlying the positions and 
interests: consequently widening the bargaining space in a new way. The Quaker 
international conciliation principle is illustrative: the Quakers attempt to penetrate the 
«belief-system» of the leaders of parties in conflict. By disrupting those images and 
attitudes the parties might be willing to redefine the situation sufficiently to permit 
some accommodation (ibid: 299). This does not however imply a «sudden and 
electrifying effect upon a conflict» (ibid: 300). Emberti Gialloreti emphasises that 
faith-based mediators whose primary aim is to restore healthy relationships take all the 
time needed, because they believe the process itself can be a contributing factor for 
altering a conflict situation (Emberti Gialloreti 03.02.2010). Attitudes and perceptions 
                                                
35 Mitchell states that in virtually all cases of mediation the mediator accepts the parties’ own bargaining approach to their 
conflict and concepts of concessions. Coercion might change their behaviour, however, unaltered goals and attitudes will 
undermine these efforts, and the mediator will eventually be rejected (Mithcell 1981: 313). This is also confirmed by findings 
from Beardsley et. al: in the pursuit of long-term tension reduction and the healing of relationships, manipulation as strategy 
has a significant a poorer record of than that of more facilitative mediation strategies (Beardsley et. al 2006: 77-83, Carment 
et. al 2009: 233). 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of others do not happen randomly, people actively organize them in a process of 
selection (Bercovitch et. al 2009: 8). The reversal of this takes time and effort. The 
process of building trust and deconstructing hostile attitudes is seen as more important 
than approaching the parties’ initial positions based on their assessment of mutually 
incompatible goals (Emberti Gialloreti 03.02.2010). Hence, the primary objective and 
fundamental question in any form of conflict transformation, how to alter «the mind» 
of the opponents (Mitchell 1981: 159), is approached in a different manner than in 
traditional interest-based approaches.  
This fact makes the discussion of faith-based manipulation theoretically contradictory 
and even ontologically deviant. Indeed, as Harpviken and Røislien state: «Religious 
actors have few opportunities to introduce carrots or sticks in order to push 
negotiations forward, and if and when they do, there is always a risk that their 
fundamental credibility is undermined» (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 4). Historical 
cases of faith-based mediation have been located well within the realm of either 
facilitation or formulation (Appleby 2000: 217). By compensating for lacking 
information and applying an integrative approach 36 of cooperation the facilitators 
seek to estimate the range of mutually acceptable agreements (Beardsley et. al 2006: 
63, 66).37 Formulation can involve the actual proposal of new solutions to the 
disputants. The formulator controls the formality of the meetings in a higher degree 
and may also contribute to the negotiations by suggesting concessions (Beardsley et. 
al: 63-64, 66, Hopmann 1996: 237). These are the strategies Moore refers to when he 
claims that some types of mediation aim at establishing or rebuilding relationships of 
trust and respect in order to minimize costs and psychological harm in the long-term 
(Moore 1996: 15). Faith-based mediators follow these strategies in the way that they 
view the relationship as an underlying cause of conflict that must be approached.  
 
                                                
36 The hallmark of the integrative approach is the cooperative nature of the negotiations where one’s objectives are not in 
basic conflict and hence a mutually acceptable solution is both possible and desirable for both parties (Hopmann 1996: 47, 
59-60) 
37 Hopmann also emphasises that the facilitator creates an atmosphere conducive to reaching an agreement. He also asserts 
that the facilitator may be a contributor to cognitive change: Instead of locking the conflict within their frames of references, 
the facilitator tries to change their preferences by viewing the problem in a new light (ibid: 234). 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3.4.3 Contextual caveat  
Finally, an important aspect to remember in analysing the role of the religious actors is 
taking the social, cultural and political context into account (Appleby 2000: 227). The 
range of choices for the religious leaders is often dictated by the structural-
environmental condition of the society and conflict. In every society there is always an 
array of social, economic, and political forces that creates the structural environment 
for the conflict to play out in. This environment, Appleby asserts, constitutes «a set of 
constraints and opportunities for religious participation in conflict transformation» 
(ibid: 230). Bercovitch and Gartner underline the same element for all mediation: «the 
environment in which mediation and conflict management occur is critical» 
(Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 11). In addition, any peacemaking effort, religious as 
well, is dependent on the parties’ will to resolve the conflict. Without the commitment 
and a certain level of dependence from the parties the efforts are doomed to fail 
(Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 18).  
3.4.4 Hypotheses  
Building on the theoretical discussion in this chapter and the empirical background in 
chapter 2, it is possible to state two hypotheses. The hypotheses are a continuation of 
the research questions and henceforth the analysis will revolve around these.38 The 
first hypothesis centres its focus on the second research question, while the second 
hypothesis goes to the core of the third research question. 
1. The four hallmarks of faith-based were salient features of the negotiations in 
Mozambique and Algeria. 
2. Religion played a key role in both cases, both for mediators and the parties; it 
contributed positively in Mozambique, and negatively in Algeria.   
 
                                                
38 Tor Egil Førland claims that for statements to become arguments they have to be related to a hypothesis. The research 
question is the basis for the research; however any analytical discussion needs to hold a position in relation to a hypothesis; 
no hypothesis, no discussion, states Førland (Førland 2007: 36-37, 42).    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3.5 Summary  
The chapter introduced and discussed my eclectic approach to faith-based mediation. 
The approach emphasizes the «human» aspect of conflict in terms of attitudes and 
relationships. Faith-based meditation differs from traditional notions of diplomacy in 
that it draws on and applies elements and thoughts from religion. Through their 
approach faith-based mediators seek to alter the persons responsible for, and engaged 
in conflict. Sant’ Egidio «believe in human beings», and consequently view war as a 
human decision. Hence, the «human» aspect must be addressed first, and religion can 
help in this endeavor.39  
   
In the following chapter I set out to describe and analyze how and to what degree the 
above-mentioned hallmarks were present and influential in the negotiations in 
Mozambique and Algeria.   
 
                                                
39 The discussion also showed that faith-based mediation deviates from certain characteristics of the traditional interest-based 
approaches to mediation. On the other hand it does not appear far from the theoretical fields of perception theory and 
psychological approaches to mediation. See also footnote 6 in the introductory chapter.   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4  Analysis of faith-based aspects  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a broader analysis of the efforts of Sant’ Egidio in Mozambique 
and Algeria based on the theoretical perspectives presented in chapter 3. The chapter 
seeks to scrutinize the first hypothesis regarding the saliency of the four proposition of 
faith-based mediation. Thus, I do not aspire to cover all possible aspects of the 
comprehensive process of the peace initiatives; rather I seek to present and illuminate 
the central elements of faith-based mediation in order to assess its importance. 
 
The chapter is divided into four parts discussing the four hallmarks of faith-based 
mediation from chapter 3. Each part discusses the presence and importance of one of 
these factors. At the end of each part I give a short summary of the findings.    
4.2 The new vision and increased common ground based on religious 
principles 
A first fundamental aspect to point out is that neither of the two conflicts had a 
religious core. Rather it is fair to categorize both conflicts as traditional post-
independence struggles for democracy. Even though religion had been an aspect of the 
Mozambican conflict during the government’s persecution of the Catholic Church, it 
was never a central issue. The parties were not dependent on religion and thus, the 
mediators could not forge unity out of diversity by appealing to sacred values. Mario 
Giro explains that Sant’ Egidio rarely refers to normative religious values in their 
mediation:  
We generally do not appeal to religious values, even if I have a Catholic in front of me. It is not the point; 
religion was not a specific issue. The point is the human aspects. Religion may become pertinent. It 
depends. But in Mozambique this was not important (Giro 16.12.2009 it. added).  
 
Harpviken and Røislien assert that Sant’ Egidio’s ethos became a shared normative 
ground in Mozambique. According to them, this illustrates the potential of religious 
normative systems as a common ground for belligerent parties (Harpviken & Røislien 
 
 
48 
2005: 19). However, my interviewees did not seem to support the idea that the 
religious normative system of Sant’ Egidio was important in establishing common 
ground. The common ground was rather developed by a mutual shift in perception of 
the other party caused by an emphasis on the «Mozambican family». I will discuss this 
in section 4.4. However, in short, my material gives little evidence that Sant’ Egidio’s 
efforts in Mozambique can be explained by the first hallmark of faith-based mediators.   
4.2.1 Religious legitimacy 
Even though the Algerian conflict is also not considered religious, the conflict 
unquestionably had religious undertones. The emergence of radical Islamism during 
the seventies and the eighties and the creation of the FIS as the symbol of the 
revolutionary legitimacy (Joffé 2009: 943) clearly revealed the religious aspects of the 
conflict. Hugh Roberts claims that the radical Islamists’ assertion of Algerians as 
Muslims above all was a «massively voluntarist affair» (Roberts 1993: 140). It 
represented an instrumental mobilization of religious sentiments that manipulated 
history and religious traditions in order to achieve political gain (ibid: 144-145). 
Nevertheless, the application of religious elements was important. Millions of people 
had given their votes to the FIS and most likely internalized an Islamic worldview with 
its normative implications. In particular, the younger generations in Algeria identified 
with a radical Islamic political viewpoint through which they could express their 
indignation with the economic crisis the country was in due to falling oil-prices. 
Frustrated with the injustice and the socio-economic models practically unreachable 
for the majority, they found motivation in their Islamic roots to fight the state 
(Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 84-85).  
 
An indicator of religion’s pertinence in the conflict is the fact that the government-
controlled newspapers in Algiers exploited sentiments of Islamic pride in their critique 
of the negotiations (ibid: 111). The Liberté labels the mediators «crusaders» and 
asserts that the «traitors» of the nation have not respected their holy religion Islam 
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when they turned to Sant’ Egidio (Liberté 23.11.1994: last page).40 According to 
Entelis, this was sheer propaganda: 
The faith-based criticism is bogus. The very nature of the political organizations that were willing to 
participate proves this. Even the Berbers and the worst Islamic groups did not think that the different faith 
would stop Sant’ Egidio as serving as a mediator. In my view the criticism was a pathetic excuse (Entelis 
02.12.2009).  
 
However, the religious discourse and the government’s critique along those lines only 
shows that the normative system of Islam was a pertinent rallying-point that both 
parties tried to exploit. The FIS, which according to Giro was the most important party 
in Rome considering its wide support in the 1990-91 elections, had far more weight 
than the government in questions of Islam (Giro 16.12.2009). This religious legitimacy 
seemed important, because it was the only thread of leverage the FIS had towards the 
upcoming armed Islamic groups in the country. One of the mediator’s biggest fears 
was that the FIS would lose the influence it had over the «nebulous mass» of frustrated 
Algerians (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 106). There exists a telling example of how the 
mediation team sought to use this religious legitimacy of the FIS in order to defend 
their initiative. In response to the government’s religiously colored attack, the FIS 
leader Belhadj turned to the Quran, and a paragraph where the prophet Muhammed 
permits his followers to seek refuge in Christian Ethiopia:  
The prophet Muhammed, on seeing Qoraich’s determination in persecuting and torturing his companions, 
suggests that some of them take refuge in Abyssinia until God decides to intervene in their aid. «His lord, 
one of Jesus’ disciples, is a good man and injustice does not exist in his kingdom», the prophet said 
(Belhadj, 20.01.1995 Résponse au porte-parole du Gouvernement). 
 
Thus, when tortured and persecuted, Muslims may leave their homeland and seek the 
help of others, he concluded (ibid.). Following this fatwa of support, Rabah Kebir, a 
main figure in the FIS currently exiled in Germany, concluded that the colloque 
between Christians and Muslims was possible (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 121).   
4.2.2 Preliminary findings 
From this first point of analysis I find it reasonable to claim that the appeal to the 
transcendent dynamics of religious principles was not important in Mozambique. 
                                                
40 Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 113.  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Religion was not a central issue of the conflict and the parties did not have a sense of 
dependence on religion. The material, however, reveals that normative rationales from 
religion did play a certain role in Algeria, both in the government’s critique of the 
negotiations and also in the defense of the credibility of the negotiations. This did not, 
however, lead to increased common ground between the government and the 
opposition parties in Algeria.   
4.3 The mediator’s position and identity 
The identity of the mediators and the actors they engaged, along with the unique 
position and network of Sant’ Egidio, were important for the negotiations in both 
cases.  
 
Mario Giro emphasizes several aspects that he considers essential for their mediation, 
some of which other mediators cannot easily draw on. Their pluralistic attitude, which 
gives them a preserving optimism, stems from their interreligious work, he claims. 
Their interreligious work has given them a sensitive approach to religious identities. 
Further, he underlines their ability to draw on and engage, not just the Christian 
networks, but also the Muslim networks, as beneficial in Algeria (Giro 16.12.2009). 
Already mentioned is the valuable role of Belhadj and Mandani, not just as leaders of 
the political party FIS, but also as Muslim clerics. For Sant’ Egidio, their work with 
peace is connected to their religious identity:  
I know we are considered an actor in the religious field, because one can never separate our interreligious 
work and our work for peace. The two areas are very much linked […] the fact that we are well known as 
organizers of interreligious dialogue helps us in the peace-mediation and vice versa. That is very 
important to understand. And that gives us legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy is connected to change. 
The legitimacy of religious actors is connected to integrity, foundation, worship etc. You remain. You 
will always be there: the same face, the same person (Giro 16.12.2009).  
 
Giro underlines their role as organizers of interreligious dialogue in Algeria as one of 
the main reasons for the Algerian parties’ acceptance of them as mediators:  
This meant a lot. The parties knew us; we had a good record of our presence in the country and most 
importantly our work with the interreligious dialogue. They told me that after I had invited them by 
phone, they had called others that knew us better and asked: how are they? And they received good inputs 
(ibid.).     
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In 1993 Hugh Roberts concludes that «it cannot be disputed that one aspect of the 
current crisis in Algeria is an identity crisis» (Roberts 1993: 138). He claims that the 
sensitive question of identity has complicated the already intractable conflict further, 
and that a resolution of Algeria’s identity crisis may be required as a precondition 
before solving the crisis of the people’s loyalty to the state (ibid: 139). Giro, on his 
side, compares Sant’ Egidio’s religious identity as a business card: they leave it around 
the world in order for people to know them (Giro 16.12.2009). And as stressed in 
chapter 3, their unambiguous religious identity gives them an advantage in societies 
where identity is important.  
Sant’ Egidio’s identity is also inseparable to their engagement with the poor and needy 
in Rome and the rest of the world. This aspect offers us an understanding of the 
important question of why mediate. Emberti Gialloreti highlights two characteristics of 
their motivation:  
We only want peace. That’s our motivation. We want peace, and we believe in peace because it is in the 
gospel. That’s all. We have no further interests. In addition, we do not have to mediate. We have seen in 
Burundi and Darfur that mediators who mediate for a living can sometimes stretch the peace process, 
because if the conflict is resolved quickly, they are without jobs. Without conflict there is no need for 
them to exist. This does not apply for us. Peacemaking is not our primary goal. It is only one of the fruits 
of our work with the poor. Hence we will always have other things to do (Emberti Gialloreti 03.02.2010, 
it. added).  
 
This position makes Sant’ Egidio independent in terms of outcome. They mediate for 
free and consequently do not have to answer to anyone. Giro believes the parties in 
both Mozambique and Algeria knew this, and due to this, trusted them in a greater 
degree than diplomats from other states. He underlines that the potential political or 
economic gain associated with a peace-agreement may cause so-called «professional» 
mediators to accept poor agreements.  
If you are hired only for the mediation, then you have to perform. You are obliged to succeed. When the 
parties understand this they may start to play strange games with you in order to exploit this. You can 
become their hostage. I believe the parties saw that we had other things to do. We told them if you want 
it, we can speak of peace, but if you don’t, we have a lot to do. Nothing changes for us. In this manner, 
we are prepared to fail. The responsibility must lie with the parties (Giro 16.12.2009).     
 
Their position in a global church gives them an additional global, but at the same time 
local and credible foundation. Emberti Gialloreti explains:  
We understand ourselves, not as a part of a city or a nation, but of the world. In fact the Church is one of 
the oldest globalized bodies. At the same time we believe that in order to be global you have to be very 
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deeply rooted in a local place. The local basis of an African Sant’ Egidio community, gives also the 
people from Sant’ Egidio in Rome credibility in that society (Emberti Gialloreti 15.12.2009).       
 
Thus I agree with Harpviken and Røislien that Sant’ Egidio used their religious 
identity to «demonstrate moral integrity, long-term commitment and an open-ended 
attitude to the conflict» that over time built confidence with both parties (Harpviken & 
Røislien 2005: 25).  
 
It is also fair to say that this foundation gave Sant’ Egidio a deep empirical 
understanding of the dynamics of both conflicts. Leone Gianturco, the secretary of the 
Mozambique negotiations, holds this as a fundamental factor for understanding the 
Mozambican conflict (Gianturco 05.02.2010). As a response to a critical drought, 
Sant’ Egidio started mobilizing aid for Mozambique in 1984. Gianturco asserts that 
their personal participation made them «perceive the Mozambicans as our brothers» 
(ibid.). They learned the language, got to know the people and eventually «reorganized 
our life for this, to get close with these people» (ibid.). From their engagement they 
soon understood that the country would need more than aid:  
We started to get to know the country, know the culture and develop a passion for it. During this time we 
saw that the country needed peace more than aid. Sadly, at the time the international society was still a bit 
backwards regarding the understanding of the situation. They did not see how Mozambique had changed 
during the eighties. They were still repeating the old story of how RENAMO was a puppet for Rhodesia 
and South Africa. They didn’t understand that the conflict had become endogenous. The strings were cut. 
Thus, this perception was a constraint for peace, because it prevented them from searching for one of the 
actual party to the conflict: RENAMO (ibid.).  
 
A key aspect in diagnosing and understanding a conflict situation is to know the 
parties to the conflict (Bercovitch et. al 2009: 4). Thus, it seems the international 
community could not grasp the situation, much less solve it, without this fundamental 
and local knowledge. Understanding that the conflict was domestic, the mediators saw 
that any solution had to be found in a new relationship between the parties, not in 
models of deterrence or power politics.  
4.3.1 The Archbishop 
However, the problem was still how to get to RENAMO, somewhere in the forests of 
Gorongosa. No one seemed to know RENAMO, and many of the ostensible «contacts» 
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proved to be fake.41 After finally finding an Artur Da Fonseca, a valid representative 
who proved to have contact with Dhlakama, they were able to approach him. There 
were few better suited than Archbishop Goncalves, the same man who had first come 
to Rome and told them about the crisis in 1983, and who had been a friend of the 
community since 1976 (Rocca 2003: 26). The importance and utility of having the 
Archbishop of Beira as a member of Sant’ Egidio would prove to be unquestionable.  
 
Escorted by two strangers on a private plane and dressed in his full archbishop’s 
regalia, Goncalves was taken into the jungle in the middle of the night at the end of 
May 1988 to meet Dhlakama. He became the second public figure ever to meet with 
the mythical and mysterious leader of RENAMO. The meeting, however, went well 
and Dhlakama affirmed that he wanted democracy and peace (Gianturco 05.02.2010, 
Rocca 2003: 73-74).  
 
Contact was established. Mario Raffaelli underlines the role of Goncalves as one of the 
most important contributions from Sant’ Egidio:  
Particularly the relationship to Goncalves was important. Through him we got the essential contacts with 
the RENAMO (Raffaelli 08.02.2010).    
 
Giro confirms:  
He was instrumental to get in contact with RENAMO the first time, and to breach their initial suspicion. 
Both because he was of the same ethnic group as the guerrillas, but also the fact that Goncalves was a 
bishop: it gave him certain authority. He was no ordinary man (Giro 16.12.2009). 
 
Further, Gianturco explains the role of Goncalves in the mediation-team as a «local 
guarantee»:  
Goncalves was like a guarantee, the Mozambican in the team. RENAMO was not being cheated as long 
as he was there. FRELIMO had a more tense relationship with him, they always had. But he represented 
in a way the Mozambican people. He didn’t speak much. It was more a discreet presence. Goncalves did 
not present the Mozambican church that had failed in Nairobi; he was the people (Gianturco 05.02.2010). 
 
Hence, based on this, it is fair to say that Sant’ Egidio’s local foundation and local 
network proved essential to the negotiations. Gianturco also explains that the 
mediation could not have worked if they did not have contact with the constituency. 
                                                
41 Sant’ Egidio checked the validity of the contacts by asking them to arrange for a kidnapped Catholic nun to be set free 
from the RENAMO headquarters.    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FRELIMO had their chains of command that saw to this, but for the people in general, 
Goncalves’ presence was instrumental (ibid.).  
4.3.2 The Vatican and the time aspect 
Sant’ Egidio’s international network on top political and religious levels was no less 
important. Apart from the meeting Sant’ Egidio organized between Goncalves and 
Enrico Berlinguer, they also arranged for the parties to meet with the Pope. According 
to Giro, the position of the Pope in addition to the history of Rome had a somewhat 
subtle effect on both the Mozambican and Algerian negotiations:  
Of course there was some effect of our connections with Rome. The Pope, the ancient history of Rome 
and in particular the Vatican embeds us always with some respect. This is always a factor. Rome is a 
symbol, more than Geneva. It has an effect, but a silent indirect effect (Giro 16.12.2009).  
 
Gianturco claims the Pope was essential for breaking the mistrust between the Marxist 
government and the Church – a breakthrough he considered important for 
Mozambique’s future and the process of building confidence and acceptance for Sant’ 
Egidio’s effort of negotiating.  
Samora Machel once came to Rome, but he did not want to meet the Pope, because he did not want to ask 
for a visit, nor kneel to him. So we had to use all our Italian flexibility and arrange an invitation from the 
Vatican – something that is never done because of protocol – by writing an informal invitation on a letter. 
Eventually they met, and Machel was very happy for it. The Pope assured him that Machel was not a 
Marxist, but a nationalist like himself. As a Pole he knew the importance of the nation and independence. 
Machel was overwhelmed. This visit was important in unlocking and defusing the mistrust and hatred 
between FRELIMO and the Catholic Church (Gianturco 05.02.2010).  
 
Another characteristic factor of faith-based mediators, which has not received the 
amount of attention it deserves in the literature, is the time aspect. In a war-torn 
country like Mozambique, 27 months is perhaps what it takes to break the deep-seated 
suspicion between the belligerents. All interviewees underlined the importance of 
Sant’ Egidio’s ability to take time. Mario Raffaelli asserts that this was one of the most 
important contributions of Sant’ Egidio. The community provided a kind of mediation 
that shielded the parties from the pressure that normally comes with formal 
negotiations, which was important in order to transform the guerilla soldiers of 
RENAMO into politicians (Raffaelli 08.02.2010). Emberti Gialloreti explains:  
We have an advantage in that we don’t have to show for results. By that I mean that governments, 
statesmen and NGOs that engage themselves in mediation have to show for results. For us that is not 
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necessary, and for that reason we are freer. Free to take the time needed and free to patiently work 
through the process and build the necessary trust (Emberti Gialloreti 03.02.2010). 
According to Gianturco, they could spend a whole day on discussing only one single 
word in the agreement text (Gianturco 05.02.2010). In addition to this, the fact that 
outside parties with interests had no place at the table, and that Sant’ Egidio lacked 
manipulative means in their facilitation, contributed to increasing the parties’ 
ownership to the agreement. Gianturco highlights this when discussing the time aspect:  
Contrary to a strong mediator who usually enters the negotiations with a preconceived draft and uses 
techniques of manipulation as leverage, we spend a lot of time letting them speak about details and take 
things step by step. You waste a lot of time, but we have a lot of time. The parties had more control, and 
the final agreement was their own sweat and blood, not imposed from anyone (Gianturco 05.02.2010).   
Mario Giro claims that the possibility of using time was important. He asserts that the 
African and American mediation efforts previous to Sant’ Egidio were not serious 
because they were mostly carried out within one week or a month in order to achieve 
immediate results (Giro 16.12.2009). Their own emphasis on time stems from their 
work with the poor, he continues. The ability to persevere in the work with the poor 
equips them with the patience mediation requires (ibid.):  
You must not lose your patience when trying to build up trust to the poor. They are people just as much, 
and people can be suspicious. When you understand what this patience cost, week after week, month after 
month waiting outside the door of some poor old lady in order to gain her trust so you could come in and 
help her, then you understand the patience and resilience needed to mediate. This is not a western 
thought. We westerners want solutions immediately. Threats or interventions are easy to turn to. But there 
is no such thing as an immediate solution in mediation (ibid.).   
On another note, is should be mentioned that the ability to be patient and to spend time 
is not necessarily unique to Sant’ Egidio. There are other mediators who have spent 
months and years as well, many of whom were not faith-based.42 In some of these 
instances, like Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka, the patience and time-aspect did 
not help the situation. Claudio Betti from Sant’ Egidio has also acknowledged the 
danger of lengthy processes. He claims that long processes of negotiations may 
acquire a life of their own, where one risks losing sight of the goal during the process 
(Betti 2004). On the other hand, he emphasizes that Sant’ Egidio’s patience is not 
inaction, but a «continuous and profound dialogue» accompanied by the awareness 
                                                
42 E.g. Norway’s role on Sri Lanka and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland. 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that any moment lost is disastrous for the people who suffer and a consciousness about 
the potential harmfulness of a hurried solution (ibid.).  
In the resolution of Mozambique’s civil war, it seems this long-term commitment and 
patience was essential.  
4.3.3 Preliminary findings 
In sum, it can be argued that the position and identity of Sant’ Egidio and the religious 
leaders they engaged were important in gaining the trust of the parties in both 
Mozambique and Algeria. In addition, the organizational structure and network, both 
on the local level and on the top political and religious levels internationally, appear to 
have contributed to the knowledge of the situation and acceptance of Sant Egidio as 
mediators. In Mozambique, the role of Goncalves was essential, from the initial phases 
of getting in touch with RENAMO, and all the way through the mediation process.  
 
Even though Sant’ Egidio did not have any base in Mozambique at the time of the 
mediation, their engagement from 1984 had given them a deep understanding of the 
conflict. Their ability to spend time, years if needed, was another essential part of the 
Mozambican resolution. Their faith-based approach prevented any manipulative 
pressure and enabled a greater ownership of the agreement. In Algeria, their 
interreligious work in the country from the 1970s and their mobilization of religious 
leaders seemed instrumental for receiving acceptance as mediators and for the 
mediation process.   
4.4 Healing of relationships and collective wounds 
Despite little reference to religious principles, the idea of embracing a new perception 
of the other party was important in the Mozambican talks. Cameron Hume states that 
the mediators in Mozambique were facilitating communication in a way that 
reformulated the parties’ ideas into a non-threatening or neutral language (Hume 1994: 
73). Indeed, Andrea Bartoli, a spokesperson for Sant’ Egidio, said the essence of their  
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work was to find ways to express RENAMO’s ideas in terms consistent with the 
overall goal of reconciliation (Bartoli 1992).  
4.4.1 The Mozambican Family 
Over the years of war, the mistrust and hatred between the parties had grown to the 
point that the word «negotiations» was banned in the country (Gianturco 05.02.2010). 
Giro claims that the distrust was so immense that there was no idea of anything in 
common; they were miles apart (Giro 16.12.2009). A letter from Matteo Zuppi to the 
Vatican dating from August 12, 1991 is telling for the situation:  
Above all, there was the mistrust. It is still enormous and mutual, but especially strong on the part of 
RENAMO, which sees pitfalls everywhere, and is afraid of falling into the trap of integration. […] The 
mistrust has led to our proposal being met immediately by a quasi-instinctive response of rejection and 
irritation, more or less as if we had asked them to commit suicide (Zuppi 12.08.1991).43 
 
Because of this, Giro underlines that they actively had to try to change the pathological 
pattern of interaction and redefine the situation and relationships (Giro 16.12.1009). In 
this manner they were more formulators than facilitators in important phases of the 
negotiations. In the opening speech of the Mozambique negotiations Andrea Riccardi 
was careful to emphasize what united the parties more than what divided them in order 
to create some common ground:  
We are aware that we have before us Mozambican patriots, truly African, without the presence of 
foreigners. Each of you have deep roots in the country. Your history is called Mozambique. Your future is 
called Mozambique […] what unites is not a little; in fact it is a lot. There is the great Mozambican 
family, with its history of ancient suffering during the unhappy colonial period and during recent years. 
The unity of the Mozambican family has survived this suffering. […] From family we know how the 
misunderstandings between brothers are sometimes the most painful because they bring into question the 
dearest things. Conflicts with strangers pass. Still, you always remain brothers […] this is the force that 
unites, being Mozambican brothers, part of one great family (Riccardi 08.07.1990).  
 
By appealing to the metaphor of family and the struggle between brothers and 
referring to the colonial past as a common historic enemy, Riccardi attempted to lead 
the parties to embrace a new reality and heal the wounds of history and demonizing 
between the two parties. According to Mario Raffaelli this cognitive change was 
essential in getting past the most difficult issue in the beginning, the issue that all the 
other mediation attempts had stumbled on: recognition.  
                                                
43 Cited in: Rocca 2003: 155-156. 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This was very important. For the RENAMO, FRELIMO was not a legitimate government, and the 
government saw RENAMO as «bandidos armadas». And we lacked recognition, which is the condition 
for any kind of formal agreement. But we were able to overcome this by having this African, not formal 
recognition: as parties of the same «Mozambican family» (Raffaelli 08.02.2010).  
 
The labels the two leaders applied to each other in their speeches at the signing 
ceremony, over two years later, may count as an expression of this change in attitude. 
Dhlakama referred to his earlier enemy Chissano as «my dear and esteemed brother, 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano, president of Mozambique» (Rocca 2003: 213). Chissano 
on his side, turned to «brother Dhlakama» and repeatedly called for national 
reconciliation for those gathered around the same Mozambican flag (ibid: 214).  
 
This is not however a quality that needs religion or spirituality as such. According to 
Giro, «there is no such thing as a spiritual conversation» (see point 3.3.3). Although 
acknowledging their emphasis on the healing of relationships, he does not view it as a 
faith-based approach (Giro 16.12.2010). He underlines that any secular actor can do 
this, but stresses that the thinking behind it stems from their religious focus on 
humanity and attitudes (ibid.). Believing that war is the last resort of a human being, 
but, however, still a human decision, makes Sant’ Egidio emphasize the alteration of a 
decision-maker’s views on the world and others (ibid.). Gianturco explains how this 
idea of the changing of man can be fruitful in mediation, even if the initial 
incompatible goals remain:  
Their lives were slowly changing. The guerilla leaders transformed into politicians, and later diplomats. 
It’s not like a conversion, but the idea of change is what happened during the talks. We provided an 
enabling environment. Their goals remained the same, but the people changed. At the end they pursued 
the same goals but with peaceful means (Gianturco 05.02.2010).  
 
Thus, the notion of eliminating conflict seemed futile, however, the elimination of its 
violent expression was both possible and realistic according to Sant’ Egidio. The idea 
of «changed men» is also an example on how faith-based mediators depart from a 
rationalistic paradigm of negotiations. In traditional diplomacy one would perhaps 
emphasize the agreements as the guarantee that the parties will pursue their goals in a 
more peaceful manner, not the transformation of people. The default approach of 
interest-based negotiators would probably have focused on the conflict-situation and 
altered the premises of the incompatible goals first. My material does not in any way 
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suggest that Sant’ Egidio neglects the conflict-situation, after all they claim to have 
understood this better than most because of their local engagement, but their focus is 
primarily on altering the parties and their attitudes.    
 
Another feature that represents Sant’ Egidio’s somewhat different way of trying to 
reconcile the parties and change their attitudes was when in October 1991 they 
arranged for thousands of peace-cards to be sent from the people of Mozambique to 
the delegations in Rome. On the letters and petitions calling out for peace were long 
lists of signatures. The many illiterates had signed with their fingerprints. Domingos, 
the leader of the RENAMO delegation, was deeply moved when he saw that one of the 
letters was from his father, whom he had lost all contact with after having to go 
underground to fight FRELIMO. Gianturco said it was stirring to watch a guerilla 
leader like Domingos «cry like a little baby» (Gianturco 05.02.2010).  
4.4.2 Uniting the diverse 
On this third point the two cases disengage in a more distinct manner. The mere fact 
that the Algerian talks only lasted two weeks altogether and that the government did 
not attend makes the idea of reconciliation and healing of collective wounds more 
distant. However, the new opposition, which the Rome group represented, did not 
consist of good friends with close-lying ideological worldviews. Among the different 
factions sitting at the table were Islamists and Trotskyites, democratic movements and 
others representing a single-party regime. There was also enormous distance between 
ex-president Ben Bella and the man he personally condemned to death in 1962, Ait 
Ahmed. The mediators, however, made it clear that when in Rome, they all enjoyed an 
equal stature and nobody could consider himself or herself more Algerian than the 
other (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 116). Still, the FIS was the key party in the 
negotiations. They had won the elections and enjoyed both religious and political 
legitimacy, and many of the terrorists had come from their party. Giro sums up: 
Our idea was eventually to stop the development towards terrorism inside FIS, and re-implement FIS in a 
political framework with all the other parties. After this we would approach the government and offer the 
platform as a basis for negotiations. We convinced the other parties that it would be worth starting 
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 negotiations with the government even if they only accepted 30 percent of the platform (Giro 
16.12.2009).  
 
With reconciliation and democracy in mind, the mediators managed to convince the 
FIS to concede on several key areas that had been inconceivable coming into the 
negotiations.44 However, it was only after «a lot of discussions», according to Giro, 
that they managed to convince the FIS that it had to downgrade its ambitions if they 
were to succeed (ibid.).  
 
Before entering the second round of negotiations the mediators had requested a letter 
from the two leaders Mandani and Belhadj, in order to involve the highest level of 
leadership, stating the FIS’ terms. In their letter Belhadj and Mandani postulated five 
rights: the peoples’ right to free voting, the dismissal of the current «unjust» 
government, guarantees for individual freedom within the context of Islamic 
principles, the right to dismiss alliances established without the consent of the Muslim 
communities (the umma), and the elimination of the army’s role in politics as 
confirmed in the 1989 constitution (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 123). The tone and 
rigidity of the letter revealed, according to Giro, the fundamentalist attitude the FIS 
entered the negotiations with (Giro 16.12.2009). These original points were, however, 
adjusted and almost «totally modified» during the course of the discussion over the 
next days (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 124). The FIS’ attitude towards the other parties 
was altered as they eventually saw their role as one among many, with no particular 
preeminence. Concessions followed in the wake of this changed attitude:  
It was the first time in history that a fundamentalist group accepted democracy, and they never denounced 
it (Giro 16.12.2009).  
 
The fact that the Platform also included a constitutional amendment that made it 
impossible for any party to abolish democracy after an election disarmed the 
government’s concern that the Islamists’ commitment to democracy was only one 
election deep (Acakem 2004: 166). This «major development» (Roberts 1995: 260), 
                                                
44 As the first Arab Islamist movement the FIS had declared its full conversion to democratic principles, they did not request 
the punishment of the responsible behind the coup, they pledged to respect human rights, including religious freedom and 
free media, they committed themselves to constitutionally safeguard the future of free elections and not rule out elections 
once in power, they condemned violence against civilians, foreigners, public property and called for the cessation torture, 
death-penalty and extrajudicial killings (The Rome Platform section A and B).    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where someone gathered all the most important opposition parties in the complex 
battle of Algeria and managed to make them concede to the point that they were united 
as one movement for peace, had never been done before, or after, according to Entelis 
(Entelis 02.12.2009).  
4.4.3 Preliminary findings 
The discussion in this third section illustrates the faith-based mediators’ emphasis on 
relationships and the alteration of attitudes. Goals can remain the same, but the 
mediators believe that a changed perception of each other can lead to a peaceful 
pursuit of incompatible goals. My material illustrates that the embracement of a new 
reality was important to get the first piece of recognition in Mozambique. The idea of 
being brothers in the same «family» did not obstruct fighting; it made the fighting just 
more passionate. Still, from this perception of fellowship they managed to establish a 
cognitive shift and create common ground that lasted through the entire negotiation 
process.   
 
In Algeria the notion of embracing a new reality where the parties saw each other in a 
different manner was not as explicit. The transformation of the FIS and the unification 
of the highly diversified opposition can still be viewed as a healing of relationships 
and shift in perceptions. On the other hand, the fact that the main opponent did not join 
the negotiations may have made this unification somewhat easier. Finally, the material 
does not give any indication that religion had anything to do with the unification in 
both cases. The mediators did not turn to religious normative imperatives when 
emphasizing and advocating the healing of the collective wounds. However, the 
mediators’ focus on these matters stems from their worldview of highlighting human 
relations and alteration of attitudes in war. In this manner, it can be argued that 
religion had an underlying importance, but not a direct impact.    
4.5 Informal Track Two approaches 
One of the most difficult phases of negotiations is often the start. This is because it 
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concerns the question of the degree of status the parties stand to gain or lose by sitting 
at the same table (Hume 1994: 25). In such situations the third party may help in 
opening the talks.  
4.5.1 The semi-formal compromise 
In Mozambique, the RENAMO pursued international recognition and hence wanted a 
powerful intrusive third-party role. The FRELIMO government wanted to control the 
negotiations and wanted a weak mediator (ibid: 30). However, as the different attempts 
in Africa failed, Sant’ Egidio asked both parties to come to Rome to discuss both the 
question of mediators and how to move forward. Thus, it was not a formal request of 
negotiations. Dhlakama, who by the invitation of Sant’ Egidio had been in Rome in 
March 1990 and met with the Italian Foreign Ministry, had told the members of the 
community that he wanted a dialogue with the government. He asked Goncalves to 
mobilize the Mozambican bishops as mediators and arrange the talks. Chissano, on his 
side, opposed the idea of having the bishops as mediators due to the government’s 
poor history with religious authorities (ibid: 30-31).  
 
When the parties eventually met, it seems that Sant’ Egidio was a well-suited 
mediator, as they could serve as a natural cross between state authorities and church 
authorities. With the presence of Mario Raffaelli, who represented the Italian 
government in the mediation, the team had enough political relations to ensure an 
official status in RENAMO’s eyes. For FRELIMO, the team was neither the major 
intrusive third party that they feared, nor official representatives of the Catholic 
Church. Another aspect is that the parties came to Rome without any commitments. 
The ambiguous status of the talks and the lack of any clear mandate made the 
arrangement a freer affair. Gianturco underlines that they never planned to become 
mediators; it just so happened that they seemed tailored for the task.  
Who were we? We did not know what we were doing. We had never done this. But we eventually 
understood that not many people were capable of doing this. For example, when the US first entered the 
negotiations and met with RENAMO, they criticised Dhlakama and the meeting ended with RENAMO 
declaring war on the US as well, and sent the diplomat away shouting. Because RENAMO’s mindset was 
so closed, it was not easy for the diplomats to deal with these people. At some stage it also became 
difficult to deal with the government (Gianturco 05.02.2010). 
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The fact that they never planned or envisaged themselves as mediators may have 
reinforced their credibility as neutral interlocutors. Gianturco asserts that when Britain 
and France later joined the negotiations on the question of the Mozambican military, 
they had clear national interests (ibid.)  
I understand that they had interests in this, because it was politics to them. But we had no interests and 
this weakness became our strength. But when the Italian Foreign Ministry felt we were too weak, they 
sent us Raffaelli. He was a great asset to the mediation (ibid.).  
 
Another reason for both parties to choose track two was that the community had built 
relations to both sides since their engagement started. Through Goncalves they had 
established contacts with the RENAMO movement. However, trust was also needed 
on FRELIMO’s part. Gianturco claims they were surprised by the apprehension and 
uncertainty of the government; they were not the experienced statesmen one could 
have expected (ibid.).  
We understood that we had to become personal friends with the government, and speak the same 
language. And we did this, in a very frank way. In a time marked by anxious post-colonial relations such 
as patron-client and donor-recipient, this was very easy for us. Of course we were Italian, but Italy was 
not a colonial power. And you have Rome, it is a special place: the Pope, the history. So we had more 
opportunities than many other people had. This was very useful in the initial phase (ibid.). 
   
Because members from Sant’ Egidio met with the government and even arranged 
several meetings with the Pope, they developed trust in the community. A proof of this 
friendship was seen when a Catholic priest was arrested in 1987 for having criticized 
the government in public. The community contacted the government and asked for his 
release. Later that same day, he was released (ibid.).  
 
However, the Mozambican negotiations were not entirely track two. Even though Giro 
asserts in the interview that the mediation «was nearly completely track two», he also 
contests the idea of a complete track two explanation (Giro 16.12.2010).  
At a certain point we involved track one. We called to the table America, France, Portugal, South-Africa, 
yes even Apartheid. It is always better to involve all influential track one actors than having them outside 
as spoilers. The real solution was track one and a half. Synergy. Because, when you reach a solution, it 
has to be guaranteed and implemented by the international community. This was the case in Mozambique 
(ibid.).  
 
In August 1991 the issue of transition until the election and the issue of the election 
system created an impasse over which the mediators could not reign. Cameron Hume, 
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who himself observed the negotiations on behalf of the US, asserts that the weak 
framework of the negotiations seemed exhausted. In order to sustain the talks and not 
get replaced by official outside parties with interests, the mediators confirmed US 
support (Hume 1994: 68).45   
 
Raffaelli even claims the Mozambican negotiations were not any different from formal 
negotiation. Even though there was a division of labour, the formal track one actors 
were present and important throughout the whole process:  
If you look at the agreement, the implementation of the peace, the UN collaboration, the presence of the 
military experts in the last rounds, it was not a different approach. Zimbabwe was, for example, essential 
in the first important partial cease-fire in the corridors. The nations who joined the commission to monitor 
that agreement were important. Considering this, the agreement was like any formal agreement. But it 
was made up by a joint effort of actors from the civil society, like Sant’ Egidio and institutions like the 
Italian government and the international community (Raffaelli 08.02.2010 it. added). 
  
My material clearly indicates a fruitful synergy of forces. Sant’ Egidio’s informal track 
and role seemed essential in getting the parties to the table: both because they had the 
parties’ confidence, and because of the convenient solutions this middle-way offered 
to the thorny question of recognition. However, the negotiations took a more formal 
turn as the process went along. This development is natural considering the importance 
of guarantees, the implementation of the agreement, and the transitional period until 
the election.  
4.5.2 A solitary journey 
The Algerian negotiations, although quite similar in the initial phase, took a somewhat 
different path. A striking similarity is that the parties were invited to Rome on the 
same non-committal premises. Giro explains:  
Our proposal was very simple: it was not possible to speak about peace publicly in Algeria. Come to 
Rome or Paris! We offer you the possibility to have a colloquium open with journalists, media etc. to 
speak openly, freely and authentically about the crisis in Algeria, and to try to find possibilities for a 
peaceful settlement. The only condition we put forward is that the talks will only be about peace; don’t 
come to Rome to talk about war (Giro 16.12.2009). 
 
   
                                                
45 Already after the failure of the Malawi talks, Chissano met with President Bush in Washington. At the departure ceremony 
Bush stated: «We urge all parties to talk at the earliest opportunity so as to avoid further suffering» (New York Times March 
14, 1990). Thus, the helping hand of the US was present from the start and throughout the negotiations.   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However, in Mozambique, Sant’ Egidio was asked a few times before they organized 
their own initiative. In Algeria, no one asked them to mediate. The initiative was 
entirely track two, with all mediators from Sant’ Egidio, and neither explicit nor 
implicit cooperation with governments. Apart from some verbal support from the US 
and tacit support from some European nations in relation to the first round of 
negotiations, Sant’ Egidio operated alone (Raffaelli 08.02.2010). Mario Giro gives a 
simple answer as to why they were alone in this effort, and why they succeeded in 
gathering all the important parties, except the government:  
Because we did it. My impression is that no one really seriously tried to do this gathering, because others 
only wanted to gather a part of them: for example, not the fundamentalists. Really, no one wanted the 
whole picture (Giro 16.12.2009 it. added).  
 
This track two approach was not, however, outside the limelight of the media at first, 
as the Mozambique negotiations had been. The presence of over 200 journalists saw to 
that. The second encounter in Rome on the other hand, was completely sheltered from 
media, and was important for the free and non-committal discussion to flow (ibid.).  
 
Having tasted what could possibly come out of the talks, the Algerian parties 
themselves asked the community to facilitate the next gathering in January 1995. 
Again, the government refused, even though Sant’ Egidio tried to include them every 
step of the way (ibid.). It quickly became obvious that the colloquium could not take 
the form of official negotiations, with neither the Algerian government, nor the 
international community on board. This was not Sant’ Egidio’s intention either. In 
fact, they had no clear idea of what the initiative would entail, however they felt 
obliged to try something (ibid.). A few days after the release of the Platform, the 
international community was still by and large hesitant, and the Algerian government 
rejected it. With no formal track one actor willing to drive the process, push the 
Algerian government and guarantee the agreement’s future, it seems it was nipped in 
the bud. 
4.5.3 Preliminary findings 
In conclusion, it may seem that the informality of faith-based mediation in the 
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Mozambique negotiations was best seen in the initial phase. Despite the fact that Sant’ 
Egidio remained the main mediators together with Goncalves and Raffaelli throughout 
the entire process, the process involved many official governments and institutions that 
would prove crucial for the outcome. The process of implementing the agreement was 
also completely official. This does not, however, deprive the community of its merit, 
as they played a highly important role in getting the parties to the table and remained 
both parties’ trusted mediator throughout the process. The Algerian talks were track 
two all the way, from start to finish. Hence, Sant’ Egidio should have whatever merit 
or shame the initiative produced. No governments or international institutions engaged 
directly in the Algerian negotiations. 
4.6 Summary 
The chapter showed that certain hallmarks of faith-based mediation were characteristic 
of Sant’ Egidio’s approach and important in certain phases of both cases of 
negotiations. It thus gives support for the first hypothesis from chapter 3.  
 
Their identity and position gave them a credible reputation, a way to reach the parties, 
a unique knowledge of the conflicts and the patience necessary to reach agreements. In 
both cases Sant’ Egidio emphasized the restoration of relationships and healthy 
perceptions of each other. This last factor was, however, more explicit in the 
Mozambican case. Both cases started out as track two negotiations. While the Algerian 
case remained track two, the Mozambican talks developed as a case of synergy and 
were completely delegated to the formal track in the implementation phase. The final 
hallmark, the appeal to sacred texts and normative rationales of religion, was observed 
in the Algerian case, but not in Mozambique. Sant’ Egidio does not seem to emphasize 
this last hallmark in their mediation. Perhaps this only underlines the secular nature of 
the conflicts, when a faith-based mediator like Sant’ Egidio does not believe normative 
rationales from religion can restrain the conflict. 
 
The next chapter sets out to discuss the findings from this chapter and more closely 
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explore the role of religion. The discussion will go deeper into the question of which 
factors can explain the success of Mozambique and the failure of Algeria. The 
theoretical focus seeks to give some answers to the second hypothesis following the 
third research question.   
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5 Analysis of outcomes and the role of religion 
5.1 Introduction 
Based on the discussion of the presence or absence of faith-based aspects in the two 
cases of mediation, I now proceed by discussing the second hypothesis: Religion 
played a key role in both cases, both for mediators and the parties; it contributed 
positively in Mozambique, and negatively in Algeria. I seek to analyze research 
question three, why did this form of mediation work in Mozambique and fail in 
Algeria?  
 
A natural point of departure can be to assess the difference in religious background 
and traditions in the two countries. The obvious fact that Sant’ Egidio is a Catholic 
faith-based actor and hence professes a different faith than the parties in Algeria may 
entail complications and even decomposition of common ground between the parties 
and the mediator. Harpviken and Røislien also note that faith-based mediators who 
base their credibility in a normative and spiritual system that is not integrated in the 
parties’ worldviews may reduce their credibility and ability to gain confidence 
(Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 370). After all, the name – faith-based mediators – begs 
the question: what faith? Thus, the line of reasoning behind the second hypothesis 
compels me to scrutinize these aspects.  
In order to adequately assess the role and impact of religion for the outcomes, I also 
need to point to other relevant factors, factors that may underlie and differ from the 
faith-based elements discussed in chapter 4, and that ultimately may strengthen or 
weaken the hypothesis.  
 
The chapter is divided into two parts that analyze each of the two cases. The first part 
discusses and assesses the importance of the Catholic background of Mozambique. I 
also critically consider the role religion played for the outcome of the negotiations. 
The second part asks the same questions for the Algerian negotiations. I wrap up each 
part with an individual summary of the findings.    
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5.2 Mozambique – track 1 ½  
From the discussion in the previous chapter it seems fair to conclude that certain 
hallmarks of faith-based mediation were both present and influential in Mozambique. 
Most notably, Sant’ Egidio’s own identity, their link to the Vatican, and the identity of 
Bishop Goncalves, were essential in building confidence with both sides. The 
emphasis on restoring the relationship between the parties and creating common 
ground by overcoming hostile stereotypes seem to have played an important part in 
getting to some basis for recognition. The convenient middle-path that Giro labels as a 
«non-institutional, but still institutional path» (Giro 16.12.2009) that started as track 
two was important in getting the parties to the table.  
 
Some of these factors can be linked to the long Catholic traditions of the country. Most 
apparent is the role of Goncalves. He was instrumental in getting in touch with 
RENAMO. In addition, his standing among the people ensured a «local» guarantee 
that, according to Gianturco, was essential in keeping the negotiations in tune with the 
constituency (Gianturco 05.02.2010). Indeed, John Paul Lederach has described the 
unique contribution and important link mid-level leaders, such as religious leaders, 
represent. Lederach claims that these «nested» leaders are especially important in the 
implementing phase of a peace-agreement (Lederach 1997: 38-43, Lederach 2001: 
843-845, Appleby 2000: 18, 19, 241).46 The Catholic «infrastructure» of churches and 
schools was also convenient when the community gathered all the letters and petitions 
for peace in October 1991.  
 
Building on the discussion of the last chapter, it seems many of the important factors 
for solving the conflict were located well within the borders of Mozambique; however, 
these were not necessarily linked to the religious history of Mozambique. Rather, these 
factors were in a stronger degree connected to Sant’ Egidio’s religious background.  
 
                                                
46 Gianturco also noted that this level was important in the local reconciliation ceremonies they had throughout the country in 
wake of the agreement (Gianturco 05.03.2009). 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5.2.1 The religious factors of Sant’ Egidio’s approach  
Gianturco emphasized Sant’ Egidio’s ability to understand the conflict as driven by 
domestic factors. This local understanding was important in an international 
environment pervaded by the notion of east-west rivalry and proxy wars. However, 
this local foundation did not lead them to devalue the importance of the regional 
factors, though they had to be portioned out:  
We had to avoid the wrong perceptions of solutions and reality, and the wrong avenues. For example, the 
regional mediators. The regional factors are important, but had to be handled in a proper way. The 
discussions with Zimbabwe were very useful, for example the agreements on the corridors. The 
discussions with Kenya regarding the passports were also important, also the observers from other 
African countries. They were good as inputs, in and out. But the parties did not want them as mediators. 
They wanted it in Rome. Because they felt more free and less pressured. So it was important that the 
regional factors did not become a part of the problem, but a part of the solution (Gianturco 05.02.2010). 
 
Gianturco also illuminated the community’s ability to build confidence on both sides. 
In a time marked by the trend of international actors choosing one or the other side of 
the Cold War rivalry, Sant’ Egidio’s religious imperative to never distinguish among 
people was fruitful in earning the trust of the parties (ibid.).  
 
As mentioned, the weakness of the faith-based mediators eventually led to an 
extensive ownership of the agreement. This ownership proved highly valuable during 
the six months it took from the signing of the papers until the UN forces were 
stationed in the country. Under the headline «Still Waiting: Mozambique. UN 
peacekeeping force delayed», The Economist wrote in February 1993 that:  
Mozambique seems surprisingly normal. Cars and buses swarm along roads where travel was unsafe 
during 16 years of civil war. More than 100,000 refugees have come home from the neighbouring 
countries where they had sought safety. Families are getting together again. After two dry years, good 
rains have fallen, raising hopes of a decent harvest. But peace is far from assured. The rival forces of the 
government and the rebel Renamo movement muster 80,000-armed men between them (The Economist 
06.02.1993). 
Gianturco underlines the gravity:  
War could have blown up at any moment. But, it was a sustainable peace – it was their own (Gianturco 
05.02.2010.). 
  
Religion also seems to have played a part by convincing the parties of Sant’ Egidio’s 
neutrality. The gratuitous aspect of their mediation clearly stems from their religious 
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background and seemed important for the parties’ trust:  
From a rational point of view we lost a lot! But it’s a general factor of Sant’ Egidio, there are no benefits. 
We have this from our Christian background: you receive for free, and you give for free. I think this was 
important that they knew we did not receive any salary. It’s a part of the trust-building aspect. They saw 
this, and valued it. They understood that it was a commitment that went beyond the traditional diplomacy 
(Gianturco 05.02.2010). 
   
Even though a religious factor, the gratuitous element of Sant’ Egidio is still a 
characteristic related to the mediators, and not necessarily linked to Mozambique’s 
catholic tradition. 
 
On another note, it is safe to assume that the efforts of the Mozambican Catholic 
Church to start dialogue previously to Sant’ Egidio’s initiative could have functioned 
to break ground in the hostile environment between the parties. But Mario Giro 
repudiates this notion and claims these efforts only consolidated the impression of an 
«unsolvable» conflict:  
There was no platform we could build on. I remember in the beginning we had a tour to all the most 
important capitols to ask for help in the mediation. We did not think at that time that we could serve as 
mediators. But nobody wanted to engage. After all the attempts, the situation was considered hopeless 
(Giro 16.12.2009).  
 
In addition, and contrary to my second hypothesis, the fact that Sant’ Egidio was a lay 
organization, and not an official Catholic organization, was important. Considering the 
poor history between FRELIMO and the Catholic Church, the position of the 
community outside the Church, although still related to it, seemed ideal for FRELIMO 
who did not trust the Church, but eventually wanted to put the feud with it behind 
them.  
5.2.2 Non-religious factors 
There are also other important factors that had little to do with neither Sant’ Egidio nor 
religion. Some of these factors that had an obvious positive effect on the outcome, and 
should be mentioned in order to correctly assess the impact and importance of religion 
are as follows. 
 
First, although aware of the efforts of Sant’ Egidio and the importance of certain 
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religious aspects, Mario Raffaelli asserts that the single most important factor for the 
success of the Mozambican peace agreement was the external regional context. As an 
experienced diplomat in an African context he brings up the political and regional 
aspects that so often seem intertwined. 
In my opinion the most important factor was the change in the regional political landscape and the 
international political landscape. This is something I’ve seen in several peace processes that I have been 
involved in. At the end of the eighties a lot of political elements were changing for the better: new 
dialogue between the US and USSR and the stop of the African proxy wars, the new situation in South 
Africa. […] All the elements that before had locked these conflicts and helped the Mozambican war along 
were changing. This is important because the first condition of successful dialogue is to have the 
concerned parties accept that a settlement is possible. Without this there are no mediators or miracle that 
can solve it (Raffaelli 08.02.2010). 
 
Mario Giro also confirmes this regional aspect. He acknowledged the importance of 
including the neighboring states as partners, rather than risk having them as spoilers 
outside the peace process (Giro 16.12.2009).47 In addition, President de Clerk of South 
Africa explicitly asked and encouraged Italy to do something for peace in 
Mozambique (Raffaelli 08.02.2010). Italy was the first country to recognize the new 
government in Mozambique and had a long-standing relationship and a history of 
cooperation with the young nation.  
In addition the enabling global community was important. None of the documents or 
interviewees mentioned any nations that were opposed to the peace in Mozambique. 
From Zimbabwe to South Africa, from The Soviet Union and Europe to the US, they 
all supported it. Mario Raffaelli elaborates:  
I know that this is often labeled the Sant’ Egidio process etc. but it is not necessarily so. It was a unique 
condition that gave us the possibility of moving several different institutions in the same direction: Sant’ 
Egidio with the support of the Vatican, the Italian government with the support of the Italian civil society 
at large, in addition to the whole international society that was completely behind our efforts (Raffaelli 
08.02.2010).  
 
Raffaelli reveals that the mediators met with the US every two or three months to 
discuss the different possibilities and to receive support (ibid.). Raffaelli also met 
regularly with the ambassadors of the European Union in order to get the green light 
and later also extensive support (ibid.). The support of these international giants was  
                                                
47 He especially brings forth the role of President Mugabe as contributing and important for the African legitimacy of the 
agreement (Giro 16.12.2009).  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important in getting the old colonial power Portugal and South Africa behind the 
effort, Raffaelli explains (ibid.).  
 
However, having mentioned this, Raffaelli goes on to describe Sant’ Egidio’s and 
Goncalve’s unerring capability of building good relationships with both sides as an 
indispensible asset. The possibility of exploiting all these elements combined was the 
important key to the positive outcome of the negotiations, he concludes (ibid.).  
Thus, it seems clear that even though the conflict had become domestic, its resolution 
still needed external international assistance.  
 
Second, the solution was political. Economic or ethnic determinants were not 
influential or interfering issues in the conflict. It was all about how to run the country; 
no one could, for example, buy the peace (Gianturco 05.02.2010). Even though not 
linked to religion, Gianturco links this point to the essential local understanding of the 
conflict, in which Sant’ Egidio played an important role.  
A third point is that the Mozambican conflict was only made up of two parties. This 
makes the issue of negotiations easier for any mediator. As Gianturco says: «we were 
lucky there were only two parties» (ibid.).  
Fourth, the issue of the past was not influential. The mediators never indulged 
themselves with the past; they tried to avoid it:  
Justice and peace do not always go together. Today you have the trade-off between justice and peace. 
Peace to me is a greater justice, the ultimate justice. In South Africa they needed the truth and 
reconciliation commission. That would have been absurd in Mozambique. We did not concentrate on the 
past, but on the future. Horrible things had been done, but that was a part of the war. People just stopped 
fighting from one day to the next. We had local healing processes in the churches, but not in association 
with the agreement. We followed the Pope’s suggestion: We sought what united the people instead of 
what divided them. When in Rome in July 1990, it could have been very easy and tempting to say: who 
killed this and that in 1979? And why did you do the massacre in 1983? We had to avoid the past. This 
was the choice of the parties and we followed it (Gianturco 05.02.2010).  
 
A fifth point was the military stalemate. Neither of the parties was capable of restoring 
peace through a military victory that eliminated the other (Rocca 2003: 15). However, 
the experience of a military stalemate in Mozambique was a far cry from getting to 
peace. Giro acknowledges the convenience of a stalemate but denies that the parties 
wanted peace:  
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No, in Mozambique, this was not true. They were exhausted with war, but that did not mean they wanted 
peace. The two actors could very well have waited for the situation to change and then gone beyond that 
stalemate (Giro 16.12.2009).  
 
Thus, even though the stalemate was a fact, the parties were inclined to tolerate further 
escalation; the hostile stereotypes were intact, and they did not perceive an easy way 
out.  
5.2.3 «A theory of the impossible» 
Considering these factors it is fair to say that important elements to the conflict-
resolution went beyond the issue of religion. This weakens the second hypothesis. 
Gianturco even claims that the issue of religion sometimes had to be avoided. Sant’ 
Egidio was extremely sensitive and pragmatic in its approach to the potential explosive 
power of religion. Knowing this first-hand, Sant’ Egidio’s mediators sometimes had to 
dissociate themselves from Catholic missionaries in Mozambique. 
Religion can be ill-suited sometimes. Even though we are Christians we don’t shout out that Jesus loves 
you on the bus. But we understood the missionaries’ plight, even if we didn’t agree at times. This was a 
division of labor: they did the advocacy-part; we did the negotiations (Gianturco 05.02.2010).   
   
Thus, Sant’ Egidio is far from ideological in its approach, rather, they appear to keep a 
pragmatic attitude that seems important when mediating.  
 
Then how was religion important in Mozambique? First of all, the role of the 
archbishop of Beira, Goncalves, and his status throughout the country seemed 
essential. Religion also formed Sant’ Egidio’s fruitful method of mediating. Also 
important was Sant’ Egidio’s ability to draw on the Vatican, who, willing or unwilling, 
had a unique position in Mozambique after hundreds of years with Catholicism as the 
official religion. The Catholic «infrastructure» provided a somewhat local resource 
available to be activated. Sant’ Egidio’s religious background was not something 
foreign. All these elements were fruitful, even conditional at times. However, other 
factors seemed more influential. Hence, it would be an exaggeration to assert that the 
Catholic background of Mozambique and religion per se played a key role for the 
parties. Even though RENAMO ostensibly supported the Catholic Church in its feud 
with the Marxist FRELIMO government, they also kidnapped Catholic nuns. Thus, 
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their inconsistent approach to religion has to be understood in relation to their all-
encompassing struggle with the government. It’s likely that RENAMO’s pro-religious 
approach was just another sting against the government. After all, Gianturco claims 
that if RENAMO had any political program at all, it was to do the exact opposite and 
destroy whatever policy the government followed (Gianturco 05.02.2010). Isolated 
and in need of international relations, it thus seem fair to say that RENAMO 
instrumentally used FRELIMO’s aversion against religion to gain sympathy and 
support from the global Catholic Church. 
 
However, religion was essential for the mediators. It is their sole motivation for 
working with the poor. And it was this concern for the state of the Mozambican 
population that led them into the work with peace. Following their impetus that «war 
is the mother of all poverty» Sant’ Egidio found it reasonable to do whatever they 
could to stop the war. Their faith in peace as the ultimate goal for humanity gives their 
mediation another dimension. Gianturco claims their religious background gives them 
another «gear». Their strong conviction made them willing to sacrifice everything in 
the pursuit of peace. However, it does not entail naivety.  
It gives you the strength in situations where other people who do not have this point of view give up. Like 
a theory of the impossible. But it is not a naïve idea, out of the context, because we walk with the Bible in 
one hand and the newspaper in the other. This is the way we operate and live. I think it is like a 
conviction: a belief in that we can overcome the impossible. And peace in Mozambique was impossible. 
We spoke about dialogue, but it was a banned word. Because this faith makes you believe in humanity, 
you know that people can change. Another factor is the fact that a community backs us. In our church we 
had people praying. For two years, all over the world, communities of Sant’ Egidio prayed for peace in 
Mozambique. This was in a way backing the whole effort, so that the people mediating did not feel alone 
in any way. Through prayer, everyone stopped and reflected over the people suffering in Mozambique. It 
builds a common strong optimism. Even martyrdom is a part of this. We have friends and members of 
Sant’ Egidio that have died for the cause of peace. Martyrdom is just that you find something that is 
worth more than your own life. Developing this attitude can help you one day. To risk your life may save 
people (Gianturco 05.02.2010). 
 
5.3 Preliminary conclusion 
In sum, it is fair to argue that religion was not a central theme for the parties or 
influential for the outcome. Apart from the position of Goncalves, the Catholic 
tradition of Mozambique seems less important than other factors such as a simple 
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party-structure, an enabling international environment, the issue of the past, and the 
lack of ethnic or economic influence. But however marginal, the role religion did play 
was contributive. Religion seems important to the degree that it was linked to Sant’ 
Egidio. The specific religious identity and the position of Sant’ Egidio gave them 
credibility as mediators. Their modus operandi gave them the necessary knowledge of 
the situation and the patience needed to build confidence and alter the attitudes of the 
delegates. Their network, both locally and internationally, contributed. In addition, 
religion is Sant’ Egidio’s reason for mediation. In this manner, certain factors 
connected to religion and religious organizations played an indirect, but positive, role 
for the parties, but not religion per se. Considering these factors, it can be argued that 
the marginal role of religion contributed to the positive outcome.  
5.4 Algeria: «try, and always try» 
In a post 9/11-context, with the ominous prophecies of Samuel Huntington having 
continuous influence on the global discourse, one can easily fix one’s focus on the 
ostensibly vast gulf between a European Catholic community and the war-torn Muslim 
society of Algeria. As touched upon in the introduction to this chapter, the potential 
inconsistency between the mediator’s religious affiliation or identity, and that of the 
parties, may cause complications and even decomposition of common ground. Not 
surprisingly, critique along such lines was often heard in the period from November 
1994 and up until the weeks after the signing of the Rome Platform (see section 4.2.1). 
This critique is important in order to assess and answer the second hypothesis. 
5.4.1 «Christianity has intervened»   
It would have been possible to rebuke the criticism as propaganda if its only source 
had been the government and the government-controlled newspaper in Algiers. They 
were opposed to the Platform and eventually rejected it. However, this was not its only 
source.  
Franco de Courten, Italy’s ambassador in Algiers, was also accusing the community 
for not understanding the fact that Algerians find it hard to accept the interference of a 
 
 
78 
Catholic organization in the internal affairs of a deeply Islamic country (de Courten 
2003).48 Even the archbishop Henri Tessier of Algiers, who initially supported Sant’ 
Egidio, turned and started criticizing the whole idea of negotiations (Impagliazzo & 
Giro 1997: 91-92, Famiglia Cristiana 1995, nr. 2 pp. 24). Said Sadi, the leader of the 
Rally for Culture and Democracy party (RCD), one of two parties who declined the 
first colloquium and remained outside the process:  
The discussion in Rome is nothing more than a provocation, because it is impossible to be a 
fundamentalist and democratic at the same time. The worst part is that Christianity has intervened in 
order to help an ailing Islamism (Liberté 17.01.1995, pp. 3).49  
 
Hence, important voices attacked the effort, claiming that the intervention of a 
Catholic community in an already tense and religiously colored nationalistic conflict in 
North-Africa would just add another fault-line and make the situation even more tense.  
 
Giro also acknowledged the role of religion and underscored that Islam in Algeria was 
a strong social phenomenon that became the outlet for the frustration many people felt 
with the corrupt leadership and the misrule of the state (Giro 16.12.2009). Indeed, the 
meaning parties attribute to their experience and the choice of response when receiving 
conflict stimulus is a complicated output of each party’s values, needs, historical 
experience, context and mode of attribution (Bercovitvh et. al 2009: 6). Thus, even 
though the conflict was initially secular, the very context of its display made the 
Islamic interpretation of it possible and added another level to it. In a broader sense, 
this could strengthen the argument of an ostensible Muslim reaction to the Catholic 
intervention as a reason for Sant’ Egidio’s failure and thus supported the second 
hypothesis. The fact that the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) during the night between 
March 26 and 27, 1995, kidnapped and later killed seven Trappist monks in Tibhirine 
close to Medea, invigorated the potential danger of religious fault-lines and could have 
given the argument even more weight.  
 
From my material, however, it may seem that this argument only holds at face value. 
                                                
48 Cited in: Sandro Magister (ed.) «St. Egidio and Algeria. An Ambassador´s Disturbing Revelations», in: 
chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it 
49 Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 189-190. 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There are at least two reasons for this. First, as already touched upon in the last 
chapter, there is the composition of the Rome group. John Entelis, who dismisses the 
argument as propaganda, claims it was an after-the-fact criticism that lacked 
credibility: 
The critique of Saint Egidio being a foreign Catholic intervener is sort of after-the-fact analysis. The fact 
of the matter was that they were a lay organization that happened to have a faith-based character to it - 
Catholic. But they had been involved in previous negotiations, so it had an established record of acting as 
a neutral observer and negotiator. And all the parties to the Algerian conflict obviously found the 
organization credible, or they wouldn’t have participated. And when you had everyone from the multitude 
of different tribes, the Berbers and the Islamist, and everyone in between attending, obviously they had no 
problem with it. I remember the government itself was attacking the Vatican for interfering in Algerian 
domestic politics and slandered the Church, and all kinds of nonsense, trying to bankrupt the approach 
(Entelis 02.12.2009). 
 
Entelis supports Robert’s argument that the mobilization around an Islamic identity 
should be considered voluntary and unhistorical, and that the core of the conflict was 
political. Entelis, for one, was surprised how little had changed in the Algerian 
municipalities after the FIS seized control in 1991; tourists were still allowed to wear 
bikinis and people still drank beer (ibid.).  
I was never convinced that this had to do with Islamic arguments. Everyone who knows Algeria knows 
the futility of imposing a theocratic state. Algeria is enormously diverse! After talking with these leaders I 
understood that they talked the talk, but it was really about governance, politics and power (ibid.). 
 
The fact that the FIS conceded on several fundamentalist values, by accepting 
religious freedom and a moderate version of political Islam,50 and the seemingly hitch-
free cooperation between the different parties in opposition, may be an expression of 
religion’s role as a means in a political game. When push came to shove, they 
managed to put away their religious differences in only two weeks in the pursuit of 
something greater, namely, the real conflict: how to legitimately run the country.51 
  
The Vatican itself also denied the alleged connection the government-controlled 
newspapers in Algiers made between the Church and Sant’ Egidio’s initiative. To the 
                                                
50 See footnote 43 in chapter 4. 
51 In his first speech as President in 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika spoke about the Rome Platform in a more favourable manner 
than any government representative before him: «The Rome agreement is not the Koran – there are passages that could be 
added or removed. But it’s a bit like if I was feeling ill, and there was a pharmacy run by a Jew further ahead, I would keep 
walking until I got to the pharmacy with the medicine I need – regardless of who the pharmacist is» (cited in: Impagliazzo 
2010: 15). The pragmatic nature of the quote indicates a clear shift in the government’s approach to the Platform only four 
years after its rejection and may question the government’s seemingly rigid commitment and attitude towards inconsistent 
religious identities. 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Italian newspaper Ansa, the Vatican spokesman Navarro Valls affirmed that «Sant’ 
Egidio’s initiative is autonomous and in no way linked to the Holy See» (Impagliazzo 
& Giro 1997: 91).  
 
Giro claims, contrary to the critique, that the clear religious identity of both Islamists 
and mediators was important for the successful cooperation during the negotiations. As 
noted, awareness and display of identity is a part of faith-based mediators’ modus 
operandi and is an important means in building confidence. The fact that the parties 
came to Rome is «a strong argument against the clash of civilizations», Giro claims 
(Giro 16.12.2009).  
It was very clear that they were Muslims, even fundamentalists, and we were undeniably Christians. It’s 
as if the Irish people would have gone to Egypt for mediation, only the other way around. But, precisely 
the fact that we did not hide our religious roots behind something else was very important. In a time of 
globalization, our unambiguous Christian name left no doubt of whom we were to these people. […] A 
true paradox for us is that it is less of a problem for us to display our identity in the Muslim world, than in 
the European Union (ibid.). 
    
Second, except for Iran and Libya, who condemned the efforts as a «Western 
conspiracy» (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 188), few voices from the Islamic world 
opposed the initiative. Sant’ Egidio received support from several corners of the 
Muslim world. In Morocco, the major opposition parties made a joint statement in 
support of the Platform (ibid: 187). Fahmi Howeidi, the co-editor of one the most 
important Egyptian newspapers, Al Ahram, made a problem out of Algeria’s denial of 
democratic opposition in his comment on the Rome Platform: 
Why has the third world in the last few years been governed by certain kinds of regimes which have never 
before existed, neither dictatorial nor democratic, which flaunt the symbols of democracy but continue to 
extend their hidden and tyrannical dictatorial activity (Howeidi 16.01.1995).52  
 
Giro emphasizes that the true problems did not come from the Islamic world (Giro 
16.12.2009). Their effort seemed to give them an esteemed status in Muslim countries: 
What we did in Algeria was very important for our record in the Muslim world as a whole. Everybody 
knows about it, from Marrakech to Bangladesh as they say, even in Indonesia. In the Muslim world, they 
knew about our attempt in Algeria and all the criticism afterwards. They know everything, because there 
is a unique method of passing of information in the Muslim world. And we are very much respected for 
this in the Muslim world, also at the extreme parts of the Muslim world e.g. fundamentalist groups. That 
is something that proves for us that we were on the right path (ibid.). 
 
                                                
52 Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 177. 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In addition, various Islamic fundamentalist movements condemned the GIA after the 
killing of the Trappist monks. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group and even the pro-Iranian Hezbollah in Lebanon all condemned it as a barbaric 
act that broke with Islamic values (Imapliazzo & Giro 1997: 206-207).  
5.4.2 Substantial weaknesses 
Hence, one may argue that the inconsistency between the religious identity of the 
mediators and the country subject to intervention, was not the cause of Sant’ Egidio’s 
failure. On the contrary, it seems as though the religious identity of Sant’ Egidio 
contributed in the establishing of the negotiations and in building trust. My material 
thus weakens the second hypothesis, but these findings do not, however, explain why 
the negotiations failed. What keys did the Mozambican case have that Algeria lacked, 
if the religious background and traditions of the party did not influence the 
negotiations and the mediators applied the same approach? 
 
The answer to this question is composed of several interconnected parts, many of 
which further defy the argument of religion as a cause of the failure. The findings also 
reveal an essential weakness of faith-based mediators.  
 
Walton and McKersie define negotiations as: «the deliberate interaction of two or 
more complex social units that are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their 
interdependence» (Walton & McKersie 1965: 3). Hence, a first and important flaw, 
also noted by Appleby (Appleby 2000: 291), was that the negotiations lacked the most 
important party: the government. Still, Entelis describes the time of the initiative as a 
time of hope and optimism:  
It was a remarkable situation actually. Everyone except the government was there: Looking back, all the 
great and most important parties were represented, it was absolutely hope. Virtually every political 
orientation of the country was gathered. The initial assumption was that the government would have 
representatives there. They probably thought that it would produce enough pressure on the government. It 
wasn’t clear what the government or the army would do. Only afterwards it became clear that the army 
wouldn’t give up everything. The government, and the army in particular, was the key party, and as long 
as it was unwilling to participate, it was doomed to fail. However, all the other parties across the table not 
only participating, but supported it. But as long as the military was unwilling to move in or compromise it 
was doomed from the start (Entelis 02.12.2009). 
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Giro explains that Sant’ Egidio tried to involve the government at every stage.  
We called them. But they did not accept. But we were thinking that they could join at a certain point, 
because we sent them the protocols and the platform by fax. And before we presented it to the public we 
asked them for comments on it, but they didn’t answer (Giro 16.12.2009). 
 
Thus, from the abovementioned definition of negotiations, and the assumption that the 
opposition party and the government represented the two belligerents, one can say that 
the peace process in Algeria lacked one of the most fundamental attributions of 
negotiations.  
 
Second, the party structure was far more complicated than in Mozambique. The 
opposition in Algeria consisted of several parties with several ideological preferences. 
In addition, you had the potentially explosive issue of the different parties’ identities. 
Irrespective of the unhistorical nature of some of these identity categories, the 
differences between arabo-Islamism, berberism and Islamism, which Roberts reckoned 
as the most significant categories (Roberts 1993: 141-145), gave the already complex 
conflict another ethnic, linguistic and religious dimension. The fact that the opposition 
broke up into several competing extremist movements during the beginning and 
middle of the 1990s did not help. A few months after the signing of the Platform and 
the lack of an adequate response from the regime, the already complex and nebulous 
landscape of the violent remnants of the Islamist movement got even worse. A violent 
competition between the GIA and the Islamic Salvation Front (AIS), and a frequent 
change of leadership in the movements, reduced Belhadj and Mandani’s influence, 
until there seemed to be no organic link between the FIS and the armed groups 
(Impagliazzi & Giro 1997: 127-133). As Akacem puts it:  
Even if the government were to embrace mediation and negotiation, bringing all of the groups into the 
process would be a difficult endeavour. As long as the GIA and others can sustain the armed struggle, 
they will continue to do so (Akacem 2004: 164). 
 
Third, and most importantly, there was no coherent international community to back 
the mediation. As noted in chapter three, faith-based mediators are subject to the 
political and structural-environmental conditions of the society and conflict (Appleby 
2000: 227-230). While the Mozambican conflict did not upset or bother any major 
international actor, and hence received adequate political support from a unified 
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international society, the Algerian conflict stirred up a lot of international trouble. As 
Giro states it:  
In Mozambique there were no international ideas, pressure or interests at stake, in Algeria there was an 
international pressure against us (Giro 16.12.2009).  
 
However, the international pressure was not completely partial in its criticism. Many 
observers and journalists praised the initiative. Even the US praised it. An official 
comment by the US State Department’s spokesman the same day the Platform was 
released read: 
The results of the St. Egidio reunion seem to be a serious attempt to help re-establish the process that can 
lead to a non-violent solution of the Algerian crisis. We hope that concrete steps will be taken by all sides 
to reduce the level of conflict (US State Department 13.01.1995).53 
 
Le Monde wrote:  
Algeria seemed condemned to a state of impotence. Yet a handful of opposition parties of varying 
tendencies has given new life to the possibility of a peaceful settlement by proposing to the regime, in 
Rome on Friday, January 13, the idea of a national accord to save the country from the present situation 
of chaos […] The international community, and France in particular, cannot ignore this SOS (Le Monde 
15.01.1995, pp.15).54  
 
In the same vein The Economist said:  
The Algerians huff and puff about interference in their domestic affairs. It might be wise to listen. 
Algerian political leaders, including members of the FIS, spent this last week in Rome, thanks to the good 
offices of a Catholic group for peace called St. Egidio, and have come up with a peace prospect for their 
martyred country (The Economist 14.01.1995, pp. 42).55 
 
However, there were strong forces working against the initiative. These forces are 
fruitful to discuss in order to assess religion’s potential role in the critique. According 
to Giro the critique was both difficult and interesting, because it came from 
unexpected authorities.  
We suffered a lot of attacks. In all the record of our mediation, and we have mediated over the entire 
world for many years now: Columbia, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, a lot of African countries, however; the only 
case in which we received a lot of attacks was Algeria. We were attacked by a huge part of the civil 
society – they accused us of negotiating with terrorists. That was the first line of attack. This was done 
through newspapers and media. Especially intellectuals in France and Italy used this argument. The 
second line of attack was the ones thrown at us by actors like de Courten, officials who tried to undermine 
our mode of mediation and get the political environment against us. Remember this was only during one 
month, it was straining. Every hour it was a new voice attacking us. Eventually, they tried to attack us 
through the Vatican. Some ambassadors from different countries went to the Vatican, the Algerian 
ambassador as well. He was received by the Vatican by officials from the Vatican, and he asked them to 
                                                
53 From the Sant’ Egidio Archive cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 187.  
54 Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 173.  
55 Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 174-175.   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stop their people, Sant’ Egidio. Arguments went on about the little minority of Christians in Algeria, they 
could be undermined by this etc. However, even though we were not their people, the Pope defended us. 
Even Christian and Catholic bishops in Algeria were supportive of us, Tissier especially, but later after 
having received a lot of threats he turned against us. At that time we were really alone (Giro 16.12.2009, 
it. added). 
 
Even the UN general secretary, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who two years earlier had 
praised their effort in Mozambique (Boutros-Ghali 19.09.1993), tried to dissuade them 
from continuing the Algerian peace process. He expressed his opinion clearly to 
Matteo Zuppi and Andrea Riccardi (Giro 16.12.2009, Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 123).  
 
However, it was the European nations’ and especially France’s lack of support that 
was most detrimental to the negotiations. After the first encounter in December, 
England and Germany expressed only moderate interest in the initiative. They stated 
that with regards to Algeria they wished to act in unison with the rest of their European 
partners (ibid: 121-122). The most important actor in the Algerian crisis was in fact the 
European Union. With its substantial amount of economic aid, it exerted unique 
leverage on the Algerian government (ibid: 197). Clement Henry states that one of the 
last realms in which the Algerian government enjoyed a certain level of legitimacy 
was the economic one (Henry 1997: 183). However, with the collapse of oil and gas 
revenues in the mid 1980s the regime could no longer meet their population’s 
expectations in the financial area either. Heavily indebted, the government cut down 
on imports instead of rescheduling its debt in exchange for agreeing to the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) measures for stabilization and adjustment (ibid: 
183). In a desperate financial crisis, Algeria finally decided to strike a deal with the 
IMF in April 1994. This was a move previous governments had systematically rejected 
for the sake of preserving Algeria’s sovereignty (ibid: 186). Thus historically the 
Algerian government has rarely been as vulnerable to economic leverage as in these 
years. However, there was never enough consent in Europe to show such economic 
leverage.  
 
After the signing of the Platform, other European nations awaited France’s reaction, as 
they were seen as best positioned to promote a genuine transition in the country given 
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their historical relationship and their economic leverage (Akacem 2004: 157, 
Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 183). According to The New York Times, France played a 
crucial role in «propping up the Algerian government with its financial, intelligence 
and military aid» (New York Times 04.02.1995). According to Bruno Etienne, a 
French expert in Islamic Studies, the French government sold combat helicopters to 
Algiers less than a month before the Rome Platform was signed (Le Figaro 
06.02.1995).56 The Algerian crisis was a deeply sensitive issue to the old colonial 
power, and the French would go a long way to avoid allegations of intrusion in her old 
protégé’s business.  
 
Already on January 9, Ahmed Attaf, a government spokesman, claimed that they had 
proof that the Sant’ Egidio initiative was in fact a cover up, behind which foreign 
forces hid (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 166). However, for some reason, the regime 
delayed their response to the Platform several days after the signing. In the meantime 
France’s minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé, explicitly expressed that France 
supported any dialogue that could lead to a resolution of the crisis (ibid: 186). In a 
meeting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Juppé and Christopher agreed 
that they should «keep the pressure on to put an end to the violence» (ibid: 185-186). 
President Francois Mitterrand supported his foreign minister. Mitterrand actually 
suggested, in agreement with the German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, that the EU should 
organize an international conference to stimulate dialogue among the Algerians, 
building on the work done in Rome. This was a historic shift in France’s policy 
towards Algeria. Until then, Paris had tacitly supported the government in its 
cancelation of the 1991-92 elections (Akacem 2004: 158, Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 
196).  
 
After five days, on January 18, the regime responded. Attaf described Rome as a «non-
event» that attempted to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs (ibid: 190-191). The 
regime followed up with several verbal attacks on France. President Mitterrand was 
accused of having hated Algeria ever since he was Minister of the Interior during the 
                                                
56 Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 197 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Algerian war and also of seeking vengeance on the ex-colony (ibid: 197). The 
Algerian foreign minister, Gen. Abdelkader Taffar, warned the French ambassador 
that «the Algerian Government will accept no interference in its internal affairs» (New 
York Times 05.02.1995). The French support of Sant’ Egidio’s efforts would soon 
prove to be less wholehearted than first presumed.  
5.4.3 Clashing interests 
There seemed to be several reasons for the lack of political will to push the 
government in Algiers. 
Firstly, the right-wing Minister of Interior, Charles Pasqua, was explicit in his support 
of the éradicateurs in Algiers. He viewed the return of the Islamists into power as a 
destabilizing factor that could throw the country into a state of panic. He also feared 
the contagious effects and how Islamists might spread to France (Impagliazzo & Giro 
1997: 122-123). One of the fears of Pasqua and his fellow partisans on the right-wing 
side was that the Islamists would annihilate democracy when finally in power. 
However, as noted in chapter 4, both Hughs and Akacem dismiss this fear since the 
Rome Platform had established a constitutional amendment that made it impossible to 
abolish democracy (Akacem 2004: 166). Giro explains:  
Our aim was to re-include the FIS into the democratic game. This was very important, because the FIS 
were suspected not to want to play the real democratic game. Everyone thought they would win the 
election and then destroy the democracy; at least this was the idea. Then we intervened with them and 
tried to explain for them that the only possibility you have is to enter sincerely the game of democracy. 
Accept the fact that you must reach compromises. And that is what they did (Giro 16.12.2009). 
 
Secondly, Giro also points to the economic interests that were at stake in the Algerian 
conflict. Algeria was and still is an important exporter of gas and petroleum to Europe. 
In fact gas, petroleum and hydrocarbons counted for more than 90 percent of all the 
country’s exports (Ipagliazzo & Giro 1997: 225). As mentioned in chapter 3, the 
economy was centralized and income management was concentrated in the President’s 
hands and his trusted circles. Further, both the President and his power structure were 
essentially composed of military officers. Thus, the army, the guarantor of the nation’s 
stability, was completely involved in the management of the national economy (ibid: 
220, Impagliazzo 2010: 1-2). Akacem, in commenting on Algeria’s self-sufficient 
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identity that was severely injured by the falling oil-prices in the 1980s, states that:  
At each turning point in the country’s history, the army has been involved as the primary political actor. 
Today – over 40 years after independence – the military is a political actor, indeed a political institution, 
making all major decisions, even when civilian leaders have nominal control. […] The army’s political 
role is tied to its extensive involvement in and identification with its self-reliant approach to economic 
development. Oil revenues enabled the state, and thus the military, to maintain international autonomy 
and legitimacy for an extended period of time through state provision of education, employment and 
social services. Oil rents further entrenched the military, impeding the development of non-military 
political actors (Akacem 2004: 153-154). 
 
Referring to this fact, Giro asserts that the existence of powerful lobbies and the web 
of interconnected interests between some of the European countries and the 
government-controlled economy of Algeria stood behind the massive critique of their 
effort:  
Franco de Courten was used or threatened by the Italian oil or gas industry that was against any 
agreement. Because they were deeply worried that the military government of Algeria would retaliate 
against Italy because we are Italian, and stop the oil and gas delivery from Algeria. When you fiddle with 
these things… During the fifteen days of the Algerian negotiations we had more journalists at our doors 
than in 27 months of the Mozambique negotiations. Why? Algeria is a strategic country because it’s an 
oil producer. And the Italian national society of oil that is very much depending on oil, and particularly on 
gas from Algeria, was worried that Italy’s role would come back on them. They were probably threatened 
by the military government of Algeria to push on Italian politicians and the Italian ambassador to stop us. 
The companies worked behind the scenes, and we received a lot of warnings from the political landscape 
of Italy, and also of France. De Courten was instrumental in Algeria for this. But he was far from the 
most important. And he was not the worst criticizer. For example Pasqua, the Internal Minister of France, 
was really against us, and did everything to stop us. It might have been for many reasons; the link 
between France and Algeria is very deep and historic. For them it was not just a question of trade, but of 
colonial history as well. In Italy on the other hand it was very clear that the issue was oil and gas. So the 
whole situation was highly political (Giro 16.12.2009).57 
 
In addition, the Algerian government was about to have a meeting with the Steering 
Committee of Commercial Banks – known as the London Club – who was to have its 
discussion concerning rescheduling the country’s debt to private creditors February 7 
(Nashashibi et. al 1998: 61). The Algerian’s creditors (mostly composed of French and 
Japanese banks) wanted to close a rapid agreement on the more than 3 billion USD the 
country had in debt (ibid: 61). According to Impagliazzo and Giro, the banks were 
forced to come to terms with the pressured Algerian government in order to recover 
their money (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 199). A breakdown of these negotiations 
would mean a severe cut in the importation of food and other consumer goods that 
primarily came from France. Mitterrand would face many complications and pleads 
                                                
57 A third of Italy’s gas demand at the time was covered by imports from Algeria (Impagliazzo 2010: 10).  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from these negotiations if he were to force the government into dialogue with the 
Rome group. 
 
Giro believes the French lobby’s and the Algerian regime’s joint efforts together with 
the protests from the right-wing side of the cohabitation government of France, were 
important causes of the withdrawal of Mitterrand’s and Kohl’s initiative for a 
conference only three days after its making (Giro 16.12.2009). Impagliasso and Giro 
assert that, due to the presidential elections that were coming up in May that same 
year, the president couldn’t risk stirring up too much conflict between the right and the 
left, and France ended up dropping the issue (Impagliazzo & Giro 1995: 200). The 
New York Times wrote on February 9: «France appeared today to quietly shelve 
President Francois Mitterrand's idea for an international peace conference on Algeria» 
(New York Times 09.02.1995). The historical shift in France’s policy towards 
dialogue in Algeria had proved only temporary (Roberts 2001: 314).  
Entelis did not find this surprising:  
France’s record of participating in the promotion of democratic outcomes in third world countries, 
especially in countries it has previously been involved in is poor, to say the least. They have always been 
more on the side of the status quo, in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. In that manner they were totally 
consistent. It would have been very surprising if they had acted otherwise (Entelis 02.12.2009). 
 
Akacem sums up:  
While France has the ability to pressure Algeria to deal with domestic problems, its interests place 
limitations on how much it can accomplish credibly (Akacem 2004: 158). 
       
A final reason for the lack of political will to support the mediation was the recurrent 
theme of terrorism. Sant’ Egidio was repeatedly accused of working with terrorists 
(Giro 16.12.2009). Hence, another detrimental blow to the coherent international 
pressure against the regime in support of the negotiations was that GIA arranged a 
disastrous attack in front of the Algiers central police station on January 30. This 
attack threw the country back into the violent circle Sant’ Egidio had hoped to end. It 
also gave the eradicator-wing of the government legitimacy and arguments for not 
participating in negotiations. When visiting the wounded, President Zeroual stated that 
«the whole world knows that the Algerian population will not bend before such 
barbarism […] and fight until these monsters are exterminated» (Zeroual cited in: 
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Impagliazzi & Giro 1997: 194). Not long after, the current NATO secretary general, 
Willy Claes, released a statement condemning Islamic fundamentalism, and counted it 
as a threat worse than communism during the Cold War (Williams 2003: 194). Claes 
concluded that the alliance had to pay more attention to the Mediterranean basin due to 
the enormous differences between the two shores. The statement caused widespread 
outrage in the Muslim world and the Iranian government accused Claes of being 
wrong (ibid: 194, Jansen 1997: 22). However, the alliance chose a strategy of 
containment and support of the current regimes in the Northern part of Africa. For 
Algeria, this meant that the extremists, who were close to being reabsorbed into the 
political framework, were now subject to an internationally backed military solution 
(Ipagliazzo & Giro 1997: 204-205).58  
5.4.4 The marginal but contributive role of religion 
According to Giro, many of Sant’ Egidio’s critics have withdrawn their accusations in 
retrospect. Many of them have admitted being pressured to oppose the initiative: 
Today, after 10-15 years time, all the people who attacked us at that time, one by one, including de 
Courten himself, have reached out to us and asked for forgiveness and told us that we were right [to 
pursue negotiations] (Giro 16.12.2009). 59      
Still, it seems that faced with political and economic forces like these, Sant’ Egidio’s 
ability to pursue the peace was considerably confined. One may also deduce from 
these findings that religion was most likely not the detrimental force as the second 
hypothesis suggests. A first argument that weakens the hypothesis is that, according to 
Giro, apart from the government, the worst obstruction did not come from Algeria in 
general, and at least not from the religious authorities in particular. Rather, the lack of 
a coherent track one, with the ability to apply sticks and carrots that could have forced 
the Algerian government to join the democratic efforts in Rome, seems a central cause. 
Indeed, Entelis states:  
The only possibility for Le Pouvoir to participate in the negotiations would have been for Paris and 
Washington to apply serious pressure including threatening sanctions if the government did not 
participate in the negotiations. At the time, and at least now, it seems as a very remote possibility (Entelis 
                                                
58 This development was forcibly strengthened after September 11, 2001, when the US suddenly identified with Algeria’s 
struggle against terrorism and even sought its assistance (Akacem 2004: 160).     
59 After several attempts of getting Franco de Courten’s own views on the matter, he finally refused the request by email.   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02.12.2009).  
 
A second important and already mentioned factor was that most of the Muslim world 
did not condemn Sant’ Egidio for their efforts.  
 
Third, the elements of religion I found relevant for the negotiations actually 
contributed more than they spoiled. In Algeria as in Mozambique, religion played a 
role in getting the parties to the table and to build confidence. According to Giro, their 
interreligious work in Algeria had given them a much-needed credibility in order to 
function as an interlocutor. As in Mozambique, Sant’ Egidio proved itself as one of 
very few who could actually manage to gather all the central factions. Entelis believes 
that this could not have been done by anyone else:  
I can’t imagine that. People forget that this was the only organization that proved itself an honest broker 
to all the parties. Which is why they trusted it, and would have them serve as a mediator. I don’t think any 
other party would have been trusted, whether it would have been a formal government or a private 
individual. Rather than despite its Catholic origin, it was because it was Sant’ Egidio that they were 
willing to come together. I don’t think the UN would have succeeded, because it has a too formal 
structure, and the Algerian state represented would have vetoed. So, no, I think it was the most 
appropriate instrument to try to negotiate. I know some of the actual parties to the negotiations, the 
Berbers and the FIS, and they were all pretty serious about this. This was not just a public relation stunt. 
It was because it was Sant’ Egidio, viewed as a credible mediator, and because all the parties participated, 
and because it looked like it would come out with a viable outcome, that the military was so determined 
for it to fail. If this Catholic-based drawback was truly believed, and if the parties were kicking and 
screaming going to the negotiations, the government could have said: «ah, nobody is going to agree on 
that». But the fact that they were all willing, and that they felt that Sant’ Egidio was the best agency for 
doing it, was the reason why the government said: «we can’t let this go forward» (Entelis 02.12.2009, it. 
added).        
However, even though it was a unique gathering of the most important opposition 
parties and a serious attempt from all sides, it may look as though the negotiations 
were doomed from the start when the government did not join:  
The Mozambique parties were actually interested in a way out of the conflict; the Algerian military had 
just staged a coup. They were calling the shots, what interest was this to them – to accept any kind of 
negotiations that did not have them on top? On the face of it, this was a party that if it had to, actually was 
willing to give up power and compromise in the name of democracy. But by the very fact that it was, one: 
the army, two: they had just staged a coup, and three: overthrown a democratic process, - why would they 
accept a negotiation that was democratic, non-violent, when they had come to power for the opposite 
reasons? They acted totally in line with a rational actor model, they weighed the costs and benefits to 
participate or not participate in terms of where they stood. There was no reason in the world for them to 
participate (Entelis 02.12.2009).  
Giro on the other hand, disagrees. He claims the government was not necessarily 
acting rationally, because the response of the international society was so ambiguous 
 91 
in the initial phases. He claims the government’s uncertainty and internal strife on how 
to respond was the reason for their delayed answer to the Platform. In addition, the 
power-balance between the government and the violent Islamists was not completely 
clear either.  
After five days of waiting the government decided to turn it down. Today we know that it actually was 
tough discussions inside the government and the military power, the current president, Bouteflika, told us 
years after. At the time he was not the president, but a prominent personality, and he supported the 
platform. He told Zeroual to go for it: start from the points you agree on. Thus it was not completely 
rational. First, they were not sure whether the international society and the important governments would 
accept the military coup. At the time, Mitterrand for example, was against. And he was important. But 
Mitterrand was not alone in power; there was cohabitation with the political right. The prime minister was 
from the right. So, the government was not sure about what the final outcome would be. They were 
accusing the West for negotiating with terrorists, because they were not sure what would happen. Second, 
and more important: they were divided internally. Hence it was not clear in 1994-95 what would happen 
in the Algerian case. It was a bet, not a rational decision. It was not that simple. Third, in the Algerian 
case it was not true that the opposition parties thought they would be militarily defeated. Because when 
you start with terrorism you do not believe that you will be militarily defeated. In fact, it is very difficult 
to defeat terrorism. You accept that you will not win, but you also rule out defeat. It is a middle situation 
(Giro 16.12.2009).  
 
Thus, it might seem that Sant’ Egidio was closer in getting the government on board 
than Entelis thought. In any case, the effort reveals just how vulnerable faith-based 
mediators are to the structural environment in which they operate. Without the 
international community backing their efforts, they were still a far cry from 
establishing a sustainable peace in Algeria. From the experience in the Mozambican 
case, it can be argued that the international community would have had to be included 
in several phases of the peace process in Algeria: first, in pushing the government to 
the table, second, in driving the negotiations, and finally, in guaranteeing the peace in 
the implementation phase.  
 
The West’s ambivalence in relation to democratic processes that could lead to 
unwanted majorities (Islamists) also shows that the secular international society had 
more problems with Islamism than Sant’ Egidio. Akacem claims that while some 
important external nations may have stressed the need for the government to sit and 
negotiate with the opposition, their tacit and active support of the government 
contradicted their statements and prolonged the status quo (Akacem 2004: 164-165). 
In a unique moment in time when the legitimate domestic parties were united in the 
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pursuit of democratic reforms, the international society was not.  
In any case, an alternative path could not have been considered without more active and creative 
engagement by external powers, or at least active condemnation of Algeria’s actions. Given Algeria’s 
concern for its international image and leadership role, such condemnation may have had a positive 
effect. The lesson from Algeria should be a simple one: do not embark on a democratic process unless 
there is a commitment to see it through. The international community should seek ways to help fledgling 
democracies and back these commitments with credible institutions (Akacem 2004: 165-166). 
 
Mario Raffaelli also emphasizes the importance of track one: 
This is the essence of what I was trying to say: The strength of Sant’ Egidio is that they have the 
knowledge of the situation, good relationships with the players and the confidence. Without this you 
cannot do the job, no matter where you come from. But if you go alone you cannot do the job either. The 
important lesson from both cases is that you can reach the point if you have a joint effort. Civil society 
alone cannot do the job. Institutions alone cannot do the job. They have different qualities, but both are 
crucial (Raffaelli 08.02.2010).  
 
Consequently, religion does not seem to be a central factor to Sant’ Egidio’s failure in 
Algeria. Neither the Islamists, nor Sant’ Egidio, seemed to have any problems with the 
divergent religious identities. The most striking observation is the faith-based 
mediators’ frailty in regards to the lack of synergy with track one.    
 
However, as in the Mozambican case, religion can explain why Sant’ Egidio engaged 
themselves in the first place, and why they tried, despite the difficult political context. 
The fact that few other actors would interfere in a conflict with massive international 
interests at stake had little relevance for the faith-based mediators of Sant’ Egidio:  
Everybody was frozen. With the Algerian negotiation what was very clear was that the big powers were 
completely immobilized. They were immobilized because in every country there was a faction for the 
military power in Algeria, and a faction against. Because of the questions related to oil and interests. And 
this was also the reason for our intervention. We intervened because of this. There were killings and 
nobody acted. And we were upset by this fact. But when we intervened we were scandalized (Giro 
16.12.2010 it. added). 
 
Giro himself does not believe in only track two approaches, and claims that half of his 
job as mediator is trying to involve track one (ibid.). Still, in Algeria they were unable 
to succeed in this. The way Giro explains their decision to intervene clearly reveals a 
similarity to Mozambique and the faith-based character of their engagement:  
When we decided in September that we were to do something, to try something, we had no clear idea of 
what we could achieve at that moment. This is another important aspect with our mediation. Try, and 
always try. Even if you don’t have the whole program clear in your mind. Because things can be created 
on the spot (ibid.). 
 
They intervened because people were suffering and dying. Their concern for the poor 
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seemingly trumped the pessimistic prognosis of realpolitik. The fact that they had no 
clear idea of what to do, and no preconceived program, also shows their strong belief 
in the power of procedural dynamics in mediation.  
5.5 Preliminary Conclusion 
The Algerian case differs from the Mozambican case in several ways. From my 
analysis it seems fair to argue that the inconsistency between the mediators’ religious 
identity and that of the country they intervened in is not a correct explanation for the 
failure of Sant’ Egidio in Algeria. Thus, the second hypothesis is also weakened by the 
findings in the case of Algeria.  
 
Like in the case of Mozambique, some of the factors of religion that were present in 
the negotiations were connected to the mediators. First, their Catholic identity made 
them trustworthy to the parties: it seems the parties valued Sant’ Egidio’s 
unambiguous Catholic identity. Second, in some ways, Sant’ Egidio had more faith-
based strings to play on in Algeria than in Mozambique: their interreligious work in 
the country had given them a good reputation and was essential in the beginning of the 
negotiations. In Algeria they had already established networks on both Christian and 
Muslim sides, and religion had a more visible role in the Algerian conflict. Third, 
religion gave Sant’ Egidio the reason for intervening. They engaged because people 
were suffering in a country they had historic relations to and engagement in, in other 
words: to uphold their religious values. 
Based on my findings it also seems as though Sant’ Egidio was capable of exploiting 
these aspects in a fairly fruitful manner. Thus the failure is better explained by the lack 
of support from the formal track one, because of the conflicting interests of these 
actors. In order to establish a sustainable peace in Algeria, these formal actors must 
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have joined. Sant’ Egidio, who in Mozambique managed the inclusion and synergy of 
the political forces, was not able to play that game in Algeria.  
 
In short, a formal institutional effort may not have gotten the trust and concessions 
from the religious FIS. On the other hand, it seems only a strong institutional pressure 
could have elicited concessions from the government.  
 
Harpviken and Røislien point to the failure of the Oslo accords as an illustration of 
how a peace agreement can be undermined by neglecting informal religious parties in 
a conflict. Secular actors conducted the Oslo accords, and religious parties were never 
involved or consulted. Later, these groups have opposed and violated the accords with 
reference to their exclusion (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 23-24). In a conspicuous 
way, the Algerian process represents the reverse rationale. Even though Sant’ Egidio 
had the confidence of religious groups and the competent knowledge of involving 
them, they had neither the means nor the leverage to bring the political leadership, the 
government, into the negotiations. The result was just as detrimental for peace. As 
Gianturco sums up:  
Sometimes the failure is that you have failed to involve people and actors that are part of the problem and 
that should be part of the solution. We are aware of the existing power-balance, which sometimes is very 
strong and hard to change. Christian faith gives us a humbleness that urges you not to give up, but also 
accept your weaknesses. We know that sometimes the power of evil is too strong. But you have to keep 
the hope and the belief in humanity that it will change. That is what we hope for Algeria. When the 
president of Algeria in 1999 said that the Rome Platform is the basis for the political discussion now, we 
understood that the power balance has changed (Gianturco 05.02.2010).60  
  
 
                                                
60 See President Bouteflika’s statement in footnote 50 (point 5.4.1).   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6 Conclusions: reflections on faith-based mediation  
6.1 Summing up 
Our experience is that there is no model to universally apply to conflict, not even those that may appear 
more similar. I have often been thinking about the development of models, but in my experience we can 
talk of lessons learned, not of models. In most cases (I say this in order not to give a model) models can 
be drawn after the mediation and not before (Betti 2004).  
 
Compared to other areas of conflict resolution, faith-based mediation remains 
relatively unexplored. The comparative approach and analysis of this thesis may 
contribute to tell us something more about strengths and weaknesses of faith-based 
mediation in two African post-independence conflicts, and if and how this can explain 
the different outcomes in Mozambique and Algeria. This chapter focuses on lessons 
learned and gives some tentative implications the findings have for the theoretical 
framework I have used. 
 
The thesis has considered three research questions: first, in what ways, if any, did 
Sant’ Egidio contribute to the conflict resolution in Mozambique and the negotiations 
in Algeria? Second, to what extent were Sant’ Egidio’s contributions in Mozambique 
and Algeria expressions of faith-based mediation? Third, why did this form of 
mediation work in Mozambique and fail in Algeria? 
 
By comparing the efforts of Sant’ Egidio in Mozambique and Algeria I was able to 
point to some similarities and differences that were influential for the different 
outcomes of the two cases of mediation.   
 
In this and the next sections I will sum up each chapter and then illuminate some 
findings and main conclusions regarding Sant’ Egidio’s approach in the conflicts in 
Mozambique and Algeria. In section 6.3, I will briefly reflect on the theoretical 
implications my findings have for the strengths and shortcomings of faith-based 
mediators. 
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In chapter 2 I provided some historical background on both cases and the community 
of Sant’ Egidio. I also briefly described some of the different efforts aimed at 
resolving the conflicts and how Sant’ Egidio contributed. In chapter 3 I discussed the 
theoretical framework underlying the thesis. I gave an eclectic definition of faith-based 
mediation and discussed the hallmarks of the approach in relation to more traditional 
theories on conflict resolution. The chapter also developed two hypotheses that the 
analysis in chapters 4 and 5 revolved around.  
Chapter 4 analyzed the saliency of the elements of faith-based mediation in 
Mozambique and Algeria. Finally, chapter 5 discussed if religion did play a key role in 
the two cases of mediation, and comparatively scrutinized why Sant’ Egidio succeeded 
in Mozambique and failed in Algeria. In particular, the chapter analyzed if the 
Catholic mediators had more constraints in Muslim Algeria than in Catholic 
Mozambique.   
6.2 Main findings and conclusions 
My analysis has led to the following main conclusions:  
1. As we have seen in chapter 4, my material confirms the presence of certain 
important hallmarks of faith-based mediation, thereby supporting the first hypothesis 
that stressed the saliency of the faith-based mediators’ qualities.61 
The identity and position of both Sant’ Egidio and the religious actors they engaged in 
the process were important in both conflicts. Sant’ Egidio’s disinterested and 
independent, but not indifferent, stand in regards to the mediation outcome was 
important to build confidence as a neutral interlocutor. Their local presence and 
engagement prior to the mediation is descriptive of Sant’ Egidio’s work in both cases. 
This local foundation endowed Sant’ Egidio with a deeper understanding of the 
conflict situation and its causes. In addition, their independent background also 
                                                
61 The qualities and hallmarks of Sant’ Egidio were useful in both fairly non-religious conflicts. Although it can be argued 
that the African context of Mozambique and Algeria is prone to religious influence due to the relatively weak secularization 
in the countries, the core of the conflicts was secular. Thus, Sant’ Egidio was not only targeting their own believers, but also 
beneficiaries from different religious communities and secular ones. On the other hand, one may deduce from this that the 
hallmarks of faith-based mediation, and Sant’ Egidio’s approach in particular, is not as contingent on religion as the 
theoretical framework suggests. This is in accordance with my caveats raised in footnote 6.     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enabled them to spend as much time as they felt they needed. Because Sant’ Egidio 
had no need to show results, the parties were prevented from exploiting the mediators. 
Sant’ Egidio’s lack of leverage and manipulative means increased the parties’ 
ownership of the final agreement. Their network and relations to Archbishop 
Goncalves, the Vatican and the Pope, in addition to their close links to the Italian 
government and other international bodies, were essential.62 The faith-based 
mediators’ belief in the alteration of human beings in order to pursue their 
incompatible goals in a peaceful manner, and the emphasis on restoring healthy 
relationships between belligerents was affirmed in both cases. Moreover, their 
engagement was mostly unofficial and thus characterized as a track two. This, 
however, was most explicit in the Algerian case, where they operated completely 
alone. In Mozambique, their initial engagement was sheer track two, but was soon 
reinforced by the presence of Mario Raffaelli as one of the four mediators. In addition, 
in order to drive the negotiations forward, formal track one actors such as the UN and 
other governments played an increasingly important role as the negotiations dragged 
on. A rather unexpected finding was that spiritual authority or religious normative 
rationales were not a major part of their mediation efforts in any of the cases.63  
2. The second hypothesis, that religion played a key role in both cases, both for 
mediators and the parties, and that it contributed positively in Mozambique and 
negatively in Algeria, was not supported.  
Although certain aspects connected to religion were present in the negotiation process 
in Mozambique, most of them were linked to the mediators. The Catholic tradition of 
the country was not a major contributor during the talks. Apart from certain of the 
faith-based factors of Sant’ Egidio’s approach, religion did not play a key role in the 
resolution. Other factors, both characteristics of the mediation – that any secular 
mediator could have applied – and structural forces were more important than religious 
factors. 
                                                
62 In Algeria the time aspect, the parties’ ownership to the agreement and the international network were less present. 
However, as mentioned, Sant’ Egidio’s moral authority and position were, according to Entelis, the reason why all the 
different parties in opposition joined the effort, an achievement he believes few others would have been able to accomplish. 
63 Although the efforts in Algeria were subject to theological defence by a prominent religious leader, this was not a matter in 
the concrete negotiations among the parties in Rome. 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An unanticipated observation in the Algerian case was that despite the critique, the 
inconsistency between religious identities did not impair the negotiations. Even though 
religion was instrumentally applied for propaganda purposes in a stronger degree than 
in Mozambique, religion, all in all, was not essential to the conflict. Rather, religion 
was indirectly pertinent both in shaping the mediators’ approach and in giving Sant’ 
Egidio their motivation and reason for intervening.  
Consequently, Sant’ Egidio’s most prominent weakness, and the most likely cause of 
the failure of the Algerian talks, was revealed when the realities of the great powers’ 
interests overtook Sant’ Egidio’s initiatives. In Algeria it seems clear that the terms of 
a faith-based mediator – even a well-connected one like Sant’ Egidio – rests at the 
mercy and goodwill of the actors of realpolitik. The structural environment trumped in 
this manner all of the above-mentioned strengths of the faith-based mediators. When 
Sant’ Egidio ventured alone, and when there were interests at stake for track one 
actors, the community’s limitations were disclosed. Without the support and guarantee 
of the international community, they could not move the Algerian government. With 
the unique enabling international context of Mozambique, this weakness was never 
revealed. Thus, the faith-based mediation of Sant’ Egidio seems inadequate when 
undertaken in isolation. Just as track one actors might need the informal approach of 
track two mediators such as faith-based mediators, the latter needs the formal track as 
well. Sant’ Egidio’s efforts in both cases were in other words salient, but not sufficient 
for establishing a sustainable peace.64 
These conclusions provide us with certain answers to the research questions raised in 
the first chapter: 
First, chapters 2, 4, and 5 showed that Sant’ Egidio contributed in several ways both in 
the resolution of the Mozambican conflict and in the negotiations in the Algerian 
                                                
64 Many of the strengths I have noted on Sant’ Egidio’s mediation is supported by several theoreticians in the field (see Bouta 
et. al 2005, Harpviken & Røislien 2005 & 2008, Johnston 2003, McGuire 2002). My emphasis on faith-based mediators’ 
weaknesses in my comparative analysis does not find the same resonance and approval. However, the insufficiency of faith-
based mediation when facing the reality national interests and issues of traditional statecraft is also recognized by Bruce 
Nichols in his assessment of religious actors’ mediation efforts in Nicaragua (Nichols 1994: 82-83). Johnston also 
acknowledges this weakness especially in conflicts that are «superficially about religion» (Johnston 1994: 263). Based on my 
analysis it can be argued that the Algerian conflict fits this categorization.  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conflict. However, most explicitly they served as facilitators and formulators in the 
way they took initiative and shaped the negotiations in both cases. In sum, Sant’ 
Egidio played an important, although limited role in both cases. 
Second, chapter 4 clearly revealed that many of the factors involved in Sant’ Egidio’s 
mediation can be characterized as faith-based mediation. Certain of these factors were 
salient in building confidence and getting the parties to the table in both cases.  
Third, the findings rebuke the notion that religion played a key role in the two cases 
and that it was the cause of Sant’ Egidio’s failure in Algeria. In addition, the analysis 
attributes significant parts of the reason for Sant’ Egidio’s success in Mozambique to 
several non-religious causes, which further demarcates the role and influence of 
religion. Consequently, both the success in Mozambique and the failure in Algeria 
should, in large part, be attributed to causal mechanisms that go beyond religion and 
faith-based mediation. Thus, the reason for Sant’ Egidio’s failure in Algeria was most 
notably because of the lack of pressure and involvement from the formal and 
influential governments and institutions. This conspicuous lack of support was further 
caused by a complex set of diverging interests, both political and economic.  
My material thus suggests that religion played an indirect role in both peace processes: 
as the sole motivation for the mediators and as values that shaped the way Sant’ Egidio 
approached the parties and the act of mediating. Even though few of the parties in both 
conflicts were dependent on religion per se, it seems they appreciated many of the 
positive hallmarks that often accompany religious organizations.  
6.3 Theoretical implications 
If we look beyond the narrow focus of the thesis, the material allows for some 
reflections on the theoretical implications my conclusions have. These implications 
revolve around some of the possible strengths and shortcomings of faith-based 
mediation.  
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A first aspect worth mentioning is that the apparent weaknesses of Sant’ Egidio, and 
strengths of formal actors, may be considerably modified in conflicts with a stronger 
religious element. After all, the thesis analyzes the role and functions of a faith-based 
mediator in fairly secular conflicts. Even though Sant’ Egidio succeeded in exploiting 
several of their faith-based strengths in these conflicts, it was far from sufficient. 
However, when confronted with the ostensibly irrational nature of ethnic-religious 
conflicts, the influence-balance between the faith-based mediator and the formal 
traditional diplomat may be altered. In such instances the leverage of official track one 
actors may decrease. Consequently and contrary to my findings, the first hallmark of 
faith-based mediation, where the normative rationales of religious texts and traditions 
are applied, may also be more pertinent (see Kaufman 2006 and Atran & Axelrod 
2008). This will be important to consider in diagnosing a conflict.     
Further, Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu-Nimer found in their report on faith-based 
peace-builders that there is a continuous risk of proselytization and lack of focus on 
results and professionalism (Bouta et. al 2005: 43-44). From my material I did not find 
evidence for this weakness. Sant Egidio’s careful and thorough work in both cases, 
especially in Mozambique, but also in their efforts of uniting the Algerian opposition 
parties behind a serious agreement, can hardly be categorized as unprofessional. In 
addition, Sant’ Egidio did not appear ideological in their approach; rather they seemed 
pragmatic in relation to other views and religious affiliations, and sincere in their 
pluralism in the way they abstain from ideological advocacy and proselytization. 
Perhaps a clearer distinction may have to be drawn between external religious actors 
like Sant’ Egidio, and local religious leaders who may have stronger interests in 
conflicts. This fact begs the question if Sant’ Egidio is representative for religious 
peacemakers in general? Can such generalizations be made? After all, the ability of 
Sant’ Egidio to understand the political game is probably not a widespread 
characteristic for religious actors. If the findings of Bouta et. al characterize faith-
based mediators, Sant’ Egidio is not representative of their peers. However, deeply 
religious as they are, they are characterized by many of the same hallmarks. Perhaps it 
only comes to show the diversity of the field of faith-based peacemaking. Perhaps it 
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also tells of the strenuous efforts it must take to map out a coherent theoretical 
framework that embraces all the different nuances.65  
Another interesting tendency in both cases is that Sant’ Egidio’s effort and their 
archetypal faith-based qualities (e.g. local knowledge network, neutral position, and 
confidence building) seem most important in the initial phases of the mediation. As far 
as my material goes, it seems that the importance of their contribution decreases as the 
eventual need for international guarantees and the implementation of peace calls for 
the involvement of track one actors. On the other hand, the local religious leaders, 
often engaged by the faith-based mediators, may prove essential in the implementation 
of the peace. In order not to lose contact with the constituency and include them, these 
mid-level leaders seem important. 
Finally, as touched upon earlier, many of the strengths of faith-based mediators are not 
exclusive for them. Time, local knowledge, integrity, perceived neutrality, 
independence and gratuitousness, could all, in theory, be the characteristics of any 
secular actor from the civil society. Thus, these qualities may not seem as new and 
different as theoreticians would have them be (see Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 1). 
However, these hallmarks may be more available to religious actors and organizations 
because of the established records of aid, religious infrastructure, and faith-based 
motivation of religious people. However, the question still stands: is the religious 
aspect over-emphasised by the theoreticians? After all, it seems Goncalves’ significant 
role in Mozambique was important because of the traditional and general status he 
enjoyed in the society at large, not because of religion per se. Should not the same then 
go for journalists, teachers or artists? It seems important that the role and influence of 
religion and faith-based actors must be assessed in the diagnostic phase of the 
mediation and not be taken for granted. Vik correctly points out that Sant’ Egidio is 
clearly most effective in cases where they have an established presence on the ground, 
and personal relations to the parties (Vik 24.11.2009). Underlying their often time-
                                                
65 After all, there were certain faith-based aspects of Sant’ Egidio that proved important, but that were not covered adequately 
or made sufficiently explicit in the theory. For example, the interviewees’ emphasis on Sant’ Egidio’s independence in terms 
of outcome and financing and the ability of external actors like the Italian members of Sant’ Egidio, to travel to a conflict and 
engage themselves to the point that they obtain knowledge that is considered «local» is also a factor not fully recognised by 
the theoretical framework. I consider these important for the success of the negotiations. 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consuming and comprehensive approach with emphasis on the human aspects of 
attitudes and perceptions, are personal relations and confidence, thoroughly developed 
over the years.  
 
In order to fully assess the potential of faith-based mediators many questions remain. 
First of all, there seems to be a need to analyse faith-based mediators’ record and 
efforts in more religiously inspired conflicts. Perhaps other qualities than the ones 
illuminated by me will be pertinent. Perhaps faith-based mediators possess more 
leverage and influence in such conflicts?  
Second, based on my theoretical discussion and analysis (and as pointed out in chapter 
1) there is a need to link insights from faith-based mediation to traditional conflict-
resolution theory. My tentative attempt to discuss this revealed that the two fields 
might have more in common than some might think.  
Furthermore, increased focus should be centred on the incidents where faith-based 
mediators fail. My analysis uncovered some of faith-based mediators’ shortcomings. 
Perhaps this will be confirmed by other studies, perhaps there will be other weaknesses 
revealed.  
Further research also needs to include the parties’ own reflections and response to the 
faith-based mediators. I was not in a position to interview the different parties’ 
delegates in the two cases analysed. Consequently, the conclusions in my work, and in 
much of the literature on the field, are to a significant extent, based on the mediators’ 
own reports.      
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